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Abstract 
Contrary to the existing theories of private label products, we demonstrate that the 
introduction of a private label product by a retailer may improve the profits of the 
supplier of a competing national brand product. Our theory is built on two main elements. 
First, the introduction of a private label product may expand the total demand for the 
products carried by the retailer and thus enlarge the joint profit to be split between the 
retailer and the supplier of the national brand product. Second, in an environment where 
consumers do not know the quality of the private label product, the national brand serves 
as a bond to assure consumers that the retailer sells high-quality products only. This 
quality assurance enhances the joint profit generated by the introduction of the private 
label product, which, in conjunction with the weakening of the retailer’s bargaining 
position caused by asymmetric information, may enable the national brand supplier to 
earn a larger profit than in the absence of the private label product.   
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1 Introduction 
Private labels, i.e., consumer goods sold under a retailer’s brand,1 play a significant role 
in the retail markets of many countries. A recent study by Nielsen Company (2018) 
shows that in 2016 private label products accounted for 17.7 percent of retail sales in 
North America, and for 31.4 percent in Europe. Moreover, the significance of private 
labels has been growing over time. For example, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
(2010) reports that between 2005 and 2009, private label introductions as a percentage of 
all product introductions increased from below 15 percent to over 20 percent in North 
America as well as in Europe.   
The theoretical literature on this subject has examined a number of reasons for 
retailers to introduce private labels. Chief among them is that it strengthens a retailer’s 
bargaining position against the associated national brand supplier, thus enabling the 
retailer to obtain better supply terms from the latter (Mills 1995, Narasimhan and Wilcox 
1998, Bontems et al. 1999, Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004, Caprice 2017). Another 
notable explanation for private labels is that they can be used as an instrument of price 
discrimination among heterogeneous consumers (Wolinsky 1987, Gabrielsen and Sørgard 
2007).   
A common thread in this literature is that while the introduction of a private label 
product benefits the retailer, it typically reduces the profit of the national brand supplier 
                                                   
1 Private labels are also known as store brands, as they are usually sold under a retailer’s own name or a 
name created exclusively by the retailer. 
3 
 
 
(see Bergès-Sennou, et al. 2004, Table 5). This arises because the private label product 
takes market share away from the national brand. In the extreme case, the retailer may 
delist the national brand product and sell the private label product only (Caprice 2017).  
In this paper, we argue that the introduction of a private label product is not always 
detrimental to the interest of the national brand supplier. Using a theoretical model of 
asymmetric information, we demonstrate that there are circumstances under which the 
national brand supplier earns a larger profit with the introduction of the private label than 
without it.   
Our theory is built on two main elements. First, the introduction of a private label 
product may enlarge the joint profit to be split between the retailer and national brand 
supplier. By adding a vertically differentiated private label product to its product line, the 
retailer may expand its market reach and attract more consumers. The resulting increase 
in the total quantity sold by the retailer generates a larger joint profit for the retailer and 
the national brand supplier.    
An increase in joint profit by itself, however, does not necessarily entail a larger 
profit for the national brand supplier because the introduction of private label product 
weakens its bargaining position relative to the retailer. Indeed, as mentioned above, the 
literature has shown that the introduction of private label product typically reduces the 
profit of the national brand supplier. This conclusion, however, is obtained from models 
in which all agents have perfect information.   
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This brings us to the second main element in our theory, which is asymmetric 
information about product quality. To be more specific, we consider an environment 
where consumers know the quality of a national brand product but do not know the 
quality of a private label product.2 In such an environment, the retailer may have an 
incentive to misrepresent the quality of the private label product. This moral hazard 
problem weakens the retailer’s ability to use the private label as a bargaining tool against 
the national brand supplier. Moreover, the presence of the national brand in the retailer’s 
product line helps alleviate the moral hazard problem by serving as a bond to assure 
consumers that the private label product is of high quality. Both factors counteract the 
strengthening of the retailer’s bargaining position brought about by the introduction of 
private label product.    
The combination of these two elements implies that the national brand supplier may 
earn a larger profit with the introduction of the private label product than without it. The 
first element enlarges the joint profit, thus creating the potential for the supplier’s profit 
to go up. The asymmetric information enables the national brand supplier to wrestle a 
share of the increased joint profit from the retailer.       
To demonstrate our theory, we construct and analyze a model in which a retailer sells 
one or both of the following two products, a national brand and a private label, over two 
                                                   
2 In the literature, Bergès-Sennou and Waterson (2005) is – to our knowledge – the only other theoretical 
analysis that considers asymmetric information about the quality of private label product. Their focus is 
different from the present paper in that they investigate the factors that determine a retailer’s decision to 
introduce a reputable private label product. They find, among other things, that for products purchased 
infrequently, introducing a reputable private label is not sustainable in equilibrium.  
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periods. The products are vertically differentiated, with the national brand product having 
the highest quality. The quality of private label product, chosen by the retailer, has two 
possible levels, high or low. Consumers know the quality of a national brand product. But 
they do not know the true quality of the private label product when it is introduced in the 
first period; they find out its quality in the second period only if some consumers have 
consumed it in the previous period.  
We show that in this model there are three possible motives for the retailer to 
introduce the private label product. The first motive is to replace the national brand with 
the private label product. This occurs in equilibrium if the unit cost of producing the 
national brand product is relatively high in comparison with the quality gap between the 
two products and the unit cost of the private label product. The second motive is to use 
the private label product as a bargaining tool to obtain better supply terms from the 
national brand supplier. This motive, which has been extensively explored in the 
literature (Mills 1995, Bontems et al. 1999, Bergès-Sennou 2006, Meza and Sudhir 2010, 
Caprice 2017), arises in our model if the unit cost of the national brand product is 
relatively low.     
The third motive, which has not received much attention in the literature, is to expand 
the total demand for the products carried by the retailer. This motive exists in the case 
where the unit cost of the national brand product falls into an intermediate range. In this 
case, the launch of the private label product not only improves the retailer’s bargaining 
position, but also expands the joint profit of the retailer and the national brand supplier.   
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Consistent with the literature, we find that the introduction of the private label 
product always reduces the profit of the national brand supplier if consumers have perfect 
information about the quality of the private label product. This is true even in the case 
where the addition of the private label product expands the joint profit of the two firms.  
In comparison with the equilibrium under perfect information, asymmetric 
information about the quality of the private label product benefits the national brand 
supplier in a number of ways. First, it expands the range of parameter values over which 
the national brand is carried by the retailer. Second, in cases where both products are sold 
it increases the quantity of the national brand and decreases the quantity of the private 
label product. Third, it lowers the profit the retailer would earn in the event that it fails to 
reach an agreement with the national brand supplier, thus reducing the effectiveness of 
the private label as the retailer’s bargaining tool.  
Most interestingly, the presence of asymmetric information enables the national brand 
supplier to earn a larger profit with the introduction of the private label product than 
without it under certain conditions. In our model, the national brand serves as a bond to 
assure consumers that the retailer sells the high-quality private label product.3 This 
quality assurance enhances the profit generated by the introduction of the private label 
product, which, in conjunction with the weakening of the retailer’s ability to use the 
private label as a bargaining tool, may enable the national brand supplier to earn a larger 
                                                   
3 Specifically, we assume that if the retailer misrepresents the quality of the private label product in the first 
period, it will ruin its reputation and lose all of its customers, including those who would have purchased 
the national brand product, in the second period.  
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profit than in the absence of the private label product. Our analysis shows that this will 
indeed happen if the quality of the national brand product is sufficiently high.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in section 2. In 
section 3, we analyze the equilibrium in a benchmark case of perfect information, and we 
present our findings for the case of asymmetric information in section 4. We conclude in 
section 5. 
2. Model 
2.1. The firms 
We consider a model where a retailer sells vertically differentiated products. In addition 
to a national brand (NB) product, it has the option of selling a private label (PL) product. 
The latter has two possible levels of quality: a high-quality PL product or a low-quality 
PL product. Let 𝑠஻, 𝑠ு and 𝑠௅ denote the quality levels of NB, high-quality PL and 
low-quality PL product, respectively. We assume that 𝑠஻ ൐ 𝑠ு ൐ 𝑠௅; in other words, 
national brand is of higher quality than a private label product.4 
In the upstream market, the retailer purchases the NB product from a monopoly 
supplier who produces it at a constant marginal cost 𝑐஻. In the event that the retailer 
chooses to offer a PL product, it can procure the good from a supplier selected from a 
pool of competitive contract manufacturers. Competition among these suppliers enables 
                                                   
4 This assumption is common in the literature on private labels (Mills 1995, Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998, 
Bontems et al. 1999, Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004, Avenel and Caprice 2006, Gabrielsen and 
Sørgard 2006).  As observed by Steiner (2004), while the quality of PL products has improved over time, 
on average their quality is still lower than that of the national brands. 
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the retailer to procure the product at its marginal cost, denoted by 𝑐ு for a unit of 
high-quality PL and 𝑐௅ for a unit of low-quality PL. We assume that marginal cost of 
production rises with quality; hence, 𝑐஻ ൐ 𝑐ு ൐ 𝑐௅. To simplify presentation, we set 
𝑐௅ ൌ 0.  
In order to launch a private label, the retailer has to incur a sunk cost, denoted by 𝑘, 
to design and develop the product. We assume that 𝑘 is infinitesimal so that it serves 
only as a tiebreaker in the case where the retailer would otherwise be indifferent between 
offering and not offering a PL product.  
The retailer sets the retail price of the NB product and (where applicable) the retail 
price of the PL product, denoted by 𝑝஻ (NB product), 𝑝ு (high-quality PL product) and 
𝑝௅ (low-quality PL product), respectively.      
In the upstream market, the wholesale price of the NB product is determined through 
negotiation between the NB supplier and the retailer. To be more precise, suppose that the 
contract between the supplier and the retailer takes the form of two-part tariff 𝑇 ൌ ሺ𝑤, 𝐹ሻ, 
where 𝑤 denotes the wholesale price of the NB product and 𝐹 denotes a fixed fee 
charged to the retailer. We use the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution (Harsanyi and 
Selten, 1972) to model the negotiation between the retailer and the NB manufacturer.  
2.2. Consumers 
Consumers have heterogeneous preferences over quality. Following the classic 
quality-choice model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), we assume that consumers’ 
preferences over quality are uniformly distributed over an interval ሾ0, ?̅?ሿ with density 
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1/?̅?.  Specifically, let 𝜃௝ ∈ ሾ0, ?̅?ሿ denote the location of a typical consumer 𝑗. She 
receives a net surplus  
𝑢௝ ൌ 𝑠௜𝜃௝ െ 𝑝௜,           ሺ1ሻ 
if she purchases a product of quality 𝑠௜ at price 𝑝௜, where 𝑖 ∈ ሼ𝐵, 𝐻, 𝐿ሽ. If she purchases 
none of the three good, her surplus is zero. In this paper, we want to consider a situation 
where the low-quality PL product is of such poor quality that a consumer will not 
(knowingly) purchase it at any positive price. For this purpose, we assume 𝑠௅ ൌ 0.5   
From (1), it is straightforward to derive the demand functions for the products in 
various scenarios. In particular, let 𝑄஻ (respectively, 𝑄ு) denote the quantity of the NB 
product (respectively, high-quality PL product) sold by the retailer. In a scenario where 
the retailer sells only one product, NB (𝑖 ൌ 𝐵) or high-quality PL (𝑖 ൌ 𝐻), the demand 
function for the product is:  
𝑄௜ ൌ max  ൜?̅? െ 𝑝௜𝑠௜ , 0ൠ,   ሺ𝑖 ൌ 𝐵, 𝐻ሻ.    ሺ2ሻ  
On the other hand, if the retailer chooses to sell both NB and high-quality PL products, 
the demand functions for these two products are 
𝑄஻ ൌ max  ൜?̅? െ 𝑝஻ െ 𝑝ு𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ு , 0ൠ  and 𝑄ு ൌ max  ൜
𝑝஻ െ 𝑝ு
𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ு െ
𝑝ு
𝑠ு , 0ൠ.    ሺ3ሻ 
In (2) and (3), we take into account the possibility that the retail demand for a good could 
be zero if its price is too high.  
Note that for the demand in (2) to be positive, ?̅? has to be sufficiently large.  
                                                   
5 More generally, the results from our analysis will continue to hold for a positive 𝑠௅ as long as it is 
sufficiently small that 𝜃𝑠௅ ൑ 𝑐௅.  
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Accordingly, we assume that  
?̅? ൐ max ൜𝑐஻𝑠஻ ,
𝑐ு
𝑠ுൠ.                ሺ4ሻ 
This assumption ensures that when the NB product (respectively, the high-quality PL 
product) is priced at marginal cost, the demand for this good is positive.   
Another way of looking at condition (4) is that, for a given value of ?̅?, the marginal 
cost of producing the NB product (respectively, the high-quality PL product) cannot be 
too large. To be more exact, define 𝑐஻௔ ≡ 𝑠஻?̅? and 𝑐ுఈ ≡ 𝑠ு?̅?. Then (4) can be rewritten 
as 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௔ and 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ. The entire analysis in this paper is conducted under these 
assumptions on 𝑐஻ and 𝑐ு. 
2.3. Information Structure  
An important factor we will consider in this analysis is the observability of product 
quality. Specifically, we assume that the PL product is an experience good, so that 
consumers do not know its quality when the product is introduced in period 1, and they 
learn the quality in period 2 either from their own consumption experience or through 
word of mouth (i.e., the passing of product information via consumer-to-consumer 
communications).6 The retailer and the NB supplier, on the other hand, have perfect 
information about the quality of the PL product.7 Moreover, the quality of the NB 
                                                   
6 We will have more discussions about this assumption in section 4.  
7 We suppose that the NB supplier is able to acquire information about the quality through the process of 
negotiation with the retailer. One of the reasons for the retailer to launch a PL product is to strengthen its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the supplier. To achieve this, the retailer will have to present credible evidence 
to convince the NB supplier that it has indeed developed the PL product. As a manufacturer, the NB 
supplier will be able to ascertain the quality of the product from the evidence presented by the retailer.  
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product is common knowledge.  
As a benchmark, we will also examine the equilibrium under the alternative 
assumption of perfect information about product quality. In this alternative scenario, 
consumers know the quality of the PL product before they purchase it. We will analyze 
this scenario in section 3 and study the case of asymmetric information in section 4.       
2.4. Timing 
Subject to the information structure described above, firms and consumers play a game 
over two periods. The game in the first period unfolds in three stages. At stage one, the 
retailer chooses the products it plans to carry in the two periods. To be more specific, it 
selects from the following three possible product lines, indexed by (NB, PL), (NB, 0), 
and (0, PL). They represent, respectively, the product line with (i) both the NB and the PL 
products, (ii) only the NB product, and (iii) only the PL product. In cases where the 
retailer chooses a product line that includes the private label, it also determines the 
quality of the product.    
At stage two, if the retailer has chosen to carry the NB product as part of its product 
line, it negotiates a contract with the NB supplier that covers both period 1 and period 2. 
In the event that the two firms fail to reach an agreement, the retailer would sell only the 
PL product if it has incurred the cost of developing the PL product at stage one. 
Otherwise, its disagreement payoff would be zero. In either case, the disagreement payoff 
of the NB supplier is zero. 
At stage three, the retailer sets the retail prices of the product(s) in period 1 and 
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period 2. After observing these prices, consumers make their purchase decisions for 
period 1. If the retailer carries the PL product, consumers will make their decision based 
on their belief about its quality.   
In period 2, consumers make their purchase decisions based on their updated belief 
about product quality. The period 2 payoff of each player is discounted by a factor 
𝛿 ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. 
3. Equilibrium under Perfect Information 
This section analyzes the equilibrium under the assumption that players have perfect 
information. In particular, consumers know the quality of the PL product before they 
purchase it. This equilibrium will serve as a benchmark for the analysis of the model 
under asymmetric information.   
In this model of perfect information, we use the solution concept of subgame perfect 
equilibrium. Accordingly, we start with an analysis of the subgames associated with each 
of the following three product lines: (0, PL), (NB, 0) and (NB, PL).    
The first observation we can make about the equilibrium under perfect information is 
that the retailer will not choose to develop a PL product of low quality. This is because 
the assumption 𝑠௅ ൌ 0 implies that consumers will not knowingly buy a low-quality PL 
product at any positive price. Since the retailer has to incur a cost 𝑘 to develop a PL 
product, it is not profitable for the retailer to develop a low-quality PL product under 
perfect information. Therefore, we can rule out the low-quality PL product as a part of an 
equilibrium product line under perfect information.  
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3.1. Product Line (0, PL) 
Consider the subgame after the retailer chooses the product line (0, PL). In this subgame, 
the retailer will sell the PL product only. Accordingly, there is no need for the retailer to 
negotiate with the NB supplier at stage two of the game. Instead, it moves straight to 
stage three where it sets the retail prices of the PL product in period 1 and period 2.     
Recall that the cost of developing the private label (𝑘) is a sunk cost incurred by the 
retailer at stage one. Accordingly, it has no effect on the retailer’s decisions in a subgame 
starting from stage two. Rather, the retailer’s decision will be based on its gross profit 
without deducting 𝑘 or, to be more precise, its quasi-rent.   
As noted above, the retailer will not sell a low-quality PL product under perfect 
information. Let 𝑝ு௧  denote the retail price of the high-quality PL product in period 𝑡 
(=1, 2). The retailer’s total (discounted) quasi-rent over the two periods is given by 
Πுሺ𝑝ுଵ , 𝑝ுଶ ሻ ൌ ሺ𝑝ுଵ െ 𝑐ுሻ ቆ?̅? െ 𝑝ு
ଵ
𝑠ு ቇ ൅ 𝛿ሺ𝑝ு
ଶ െ 𝑐ுሻ ቆ?̅? െ 𝑝ு
ଶ
𝑠ு ቇ.  ሺ5ሻ 
The retailer chooses 𝑝ுଵ  and 𝑝ுଶ  to maximize (5). Solving this optimization problem, 
we find the equilibrium prices of the PL product: 
𝑝ுଵ ൌ 𝑝ுଶ ൌ 𝑝ு∗ , where  𝑝ு∗ ≡ 𝑠ு?̅?2 ൅
𝑐ு
2 .        ሺ6ሻ 
Substituting 𝑝ு∗  into the demand function for the PL product, we obtain 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗ , where  𝑄ு∗ ≡ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐ு
2𝑠ு .        ሺ7ሻ 
Note that condition (4), or equivalently 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ, ensures that the quantity of the PL 
product given in (7) is positive. Substituting (6) into (5), we obtain the retailer’s 
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maximum quasi-rent associated with product line (0, PL):  
Πு∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠ு .                               ሺ8ሻ 
Note that the preceding analysis is also relevant to the subgame associated with the 
product line (NB, PL). If the retailer chooses to offer this product line, it will negotiate 
with the NB supplier at stage two of the game about the terms under which it purchases 
the NB product. In the event that it fails to reach an agreement with the NB supplier, it 
would sell to consumers the PL product only. Equation (8) represents the profit that the 
retailer would receive in that scenario. In other words, (8) is the retailer’s disagreement 
payoff in the subgame associated with the product line (NB, PL).     
3.2. Product Line (NB, 0)  
Now suppose the retailer has chosen the product line (NB, 0) at stage one. At stage three 
of period 1 and in period 2, the retailer sells the NB product only. Let ሺ𝑤௧, 𝐹௧ሻ denote 
the wholesale price and fixed fee paid by the retailer to the NB supplier in period 𝑡 (=1, 
2). The retailer’s total (discounted) quasi-rent over the two periods is:  
Π஻ሺ𝑝஻ଵ , 𝑝஻ଶሻ ൌ ቈሺ𝑝஻ଵ െ 𝑤ଵሻ ቆ?̅? െ 𝑝஻
ଵ
𝑠஻ ቇ െ 𝐹
ଵ቉ ൅ 𝛿 ቈሺ𝑝஻ଶ െ 𝑤ଶሻ ቆ?̅? െ 𝑝஻
ଶ
𝑠஻ ቇ െ 𝐹
ଶ቉ , ሺ9ሻ 
The retailer chooses the retail prices ሺ𝑝஻ଵ , 𝑝஻ଶሻ to maximize (9), which yields  
𝑝஻௧ ൌ 𝑠஻?̅?2 ൅
𝑤௧
2 ,    ሺ𝑡 ൌ 1, 2ሻ.   ሺ10ሻ 
At stage two, the terms of contract between the retailer and the NB supplier is 
determined by the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution. This has two implications for 
the equilibrium values of ሺ𝑤௧, 𝐹௧ሻ. First, the retailer and the NB supplier will agree to 
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choose the wholesale prices that maximize their joint profit. Given the presence of double 
marginalization problem (Spengler, 1950), it is easy to show that their joint-surplus is 
maximized at 𝑤ଵ ൌ 𝑤ଶ ൌ 𝑐஻.   
Second, the terms of contract must satisfy the solution to the Generalized Nash 
Bargaining Problem. To be more specific, let Π஻∗  denote the maximum joint quasi-rent 
associated with product line (NB, 0), 𝜋ோ the retailer’s payoff, and 𝜋ெ the NB supplier’s 
payoff under the terms of contract. The retailer’s disagreement payoff in this case is 0 
because it has not developed the private label. Therefore, the Generalized Nash 
Bargaining Problem is written as:     
maxగೃ,గಾ 𝜋ோ
ఠ𝜋ெଵିఠ    s. t.  𝜋ோ ൅ 𝜋ெ ൌ Π஻∗ .                  ሺ11ሻ 
In (11), 𝜔 ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is a parameter that measures the retailer’s bargaining power relative 
to that of the NB supplier. Solving (11) we find the familiar Nash barraging solution:  
𝜋ோ ൌ 𝜔Π஻∗ , 𝜋ெ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻∗ .               ሺ12ሻ 
The retailer and the NB supplier can achieve the division of joint quasi-rent specified in 
(12) by setting the appropriate levels of the fixed fees.   
Setting 𝑤ଵ ൌ 𝑤ଶ ൌ 𝑐஻ in (10), we obtain the equilibrium retail price of the NB 
product in this subgame:  
𝑝஻ଵ ൌ 𝑝஻ଶ ൌ 𝑝஻∗ , where  𝑝஻∗ ≡ 𝑠஻?̅?2 ൅
𝑐஻
2 .         ሺ13ሻ 
Substituting 𝑝஻∗  into the demand function yields 
𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻ଶ ൌ 𝑄஻∗ , where 𝑄஻∗ ≡ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻
2𝑠஻ .          ሺ14ሻ 
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Note that condition (4), or equivalently 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௔, ensures that the quantity of the NB 
product given in (14) is positive. Using (13) and (14), we find the maximum joint 
quasi-rent over the two periods to be:  
Π஻∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ሻଶ
4𝑠஻ .                              ሺ15ሻ 
The equilibrium payoffs of the retailer and the NB supplier can be obtained by 
substituting (15) into (12).   
3.3. Product Line (NB, PL) 
Finally, consider the subgame associated with the product line (NB, PL). From (3), we 
see that the demand functions for the NB product and the PL product in period 𝑡 (=1, 2) 
are  
𝑄஻௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൌ ?̅? െ 𝑝஻
௧ െ 𝑝ு௧
𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ு ,    𝑄ு
௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൌ 𝑝஻
௧ െ 𝑝ு௧
𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ு െ
𝑝ு௧
𝑠ு  . ሺ16ሻ  
Note that, while the retailer has chosen to carry both products at stage one, it may set the 
retail price of one of these products at such a high level that the demand for this good is 0. 
Taking into account this possibility, we write the retailer’s optimization problem 
regarding retail prices as:  
max
௣ಳ೟ ,௣ಹ೟
Π஻ு ൌ ෍ 𝛿௧ିଵሾሺ𝑝஻௧ െ 𝑤௧ሻ𝑄஻௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൅ ሺ𝑝ு௧ െ 𝑐ுሻ𝑄ு௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ െ 𝐹௧ሿ
ଶ
௧ୀଵ
, ሺ17ሻ 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑄஻௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൒ 0; 𝑄ு௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൒ 0.                    ሺ18ሻ 
The constraints in (18) are needed to prevent the retailer from choosing those prices that 
would make 𝑄஻௧  or 𝑄ு௧  in (16) negative.   
Let 𝜆ଵ௧  and 𝜆ଶ௧  be the multipliers attached to these constraints in the Lagrange 
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function associated with this optimization problem. Solving the first-order conditions of 
this optimization problem, we find   
𝑝஻௧ ൌ 𝑠஻?̅?2 ൅
𝑤௧
2 െ
𝜆ଵ௧
2 ;                            ሺ19ሻ 
𝑝ு௧ ൌ 𝑠ு?̅?2 ൅
𝑐ு
2 െ
𝜆ଶ௧
2 .                             ሺ20ሻ 
We see from (19) and (20) that the retail prices depend on the values 𝜆ଵ௧  and 𝜆ଶ௧ , which 
in turn hinge on whether any of the constraints in (18) is binding.   
In the Generalized Nash Bargaining Problem at stage two, the retailer would be able 
to sell a positive quantity of the PL product in the event of failure to reach an agreement 
with the NB supplier. Accordingly, the retailer’s disagreement payoff is given by Πு∗  in 
(8). Let Π஻ு∗  denote the maximum joint quasi-rent associated with product line (NB, PL). 
It is then straightforward to derive the Nash barraging solution in this case:  
𝜋ோ ൌ 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ , 𝜋ெ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻ு∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ .   ሺ21ሻ 
The complete analysis of this subgame is long and tedious. Hence, we relegate the 
details of the analysis to an appendix. Here we present only a summary of the results 
associated with this subgame.8  
Lemma 1. Under perfect information, the quantity of each product sold in the 
equilibrium of the subgame associated with the product line (NB, PL) depends on 
the value of 𝑐஻ relative to the following critical values:  
𝑐஻௔ ≡ 𝑠஻?̅?, 𝑐஻௕ ≡ ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ?̅? ൅ 𝑐ு,  𝑐஻௖ ≡ 𝑠஻𝑐ு𝑠ு , ሺ22ሻ 
with 𝑐஻௔ ൐ 𝑐஻௕ ൐ 𝑐஻௖  ሺ൐ 𝑐ுሻ. To be more specific: 
                                                   
8 The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are also in the appendix. 
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a) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ, 𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൌ 0 for 𝑡 ൌ 1 and 2, that 
is, the quantity of national brand sold is positive while that of the private label 
is 0 in both periods.  
b) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕ሻ, 𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0  and 𝑄ு௧ ൐ 0 for 𝑡 ൌ 1  and 2 , 
that is, the quantities sold are positive for both the national brand and the 
private label in both periods.   
c) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሾ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔ሻ , 𝑄஻௧ ൌ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൐ 0 for 𝑡 ൌ 1  and 2 , 
that is, quantity of the national brand sold is 0 while that of the private label is 
positive in both periods. 
Lemma 1 states that the retailer will sell positive quantities of both the NB product 
and the PL product if the unit cost of the national brand is in an intermediate range, 
namely, 𝑐஻௖ ൏ 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௕. On the other hand, if the unit cost is high in the sense that 
𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕, no units of the NB product will be sold in equilibrium. Finally, if the unit cost is 
relatively low (𝑐஻ ൑ 𝑐஻௖ ), the retailer will not sell any unit of the PL product even though 
it has developed this product at stage one of the game.   
Note that the critical values 𝑐஻௕ and 𝑐஻௖  defined in (22) depend on the level of 𝑐ு 
and the relative magnitudes of 𝑠஻ and 𝑠ு. They imply that the occurrence of each 
scenario in Lemma 1 as an equilibrium depends on the unit cost of NB product relative to 
that of the (high-quality) PL product and the quality gap between the two products. For 
example, scenario c) in Lemma 1 occurs if the unit cost of NB product is high relative to 
the unit cost of the PL product and relative to the quality gap between the two products 
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(i.e., if 𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐ு𝑠஻ 𝑠ு⁄ ).  
3.4. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
At stage one of the game, the retailer compares its quasi-rents associated with the three 
product lines while taking into consideration the cost of developing the PL product 𝑘. It 
then chooses the product line that yields the highest profit. We will start with a discussion 
of the equilibrium product line, followed by a number of observations about other aspects 
of the equilibrium.  
Proposition 1. Under perfect information, the retailer’s choice of product line in 
equilibrium depends on the magnitude of 𝑐஻. Specifically,  
a) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ, the equilibrium product line is (NB, PL) with 
𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൌ 0 for 𝑡 ൌ 1 and 2.  
b) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯, the equilibrium product line is (NB, PL) with 
𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൐ 0 for 𝑡 ൌ 1 and 2. 
c) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯, the equilibrium product line is (0, PL). 
Proposition 1 reflects three motives for the retailer to launch the PL product. The first 
motive is to replace the NB product with the PL product. This occurs if the unit cost of 
the NB product is so high that 𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕, in which case the retailer drops the NB from its 
product line.   
The second motive is to use the PL product to strengthen its bargaining position.  
This motive is behind the equilibrium in the case where the unit cost of the NB product is 
so low that 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ. In this case, the retailer develops the PL but does not sell any 
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quantity of this product in equilibrium. The PL product is used solely for the purpose of 
enhancing the retailer’s bargaining position. This motive for launching private labels has 
been extensively studies in the literature (Mills, 1995; Bontems et al., 1999; 
Bergès-Sennou, 2006; Meza and Sudhir 2010).   
The third motive, which has not received much attention in the literature, is to expand 
the total demand for the products carried by the retailer. This motive exists for 𝑐஻ in the 
intermediate case, 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. In this case, the retailer finds it most profitable to carry 
and sell a positive quantity of both products. While the launch of the PL product 
improves the retailer’s bargaining position, this is not the only motive for the retailer to 
sell this product. In fact, developing and selling the PL product is profitable in its own 
right, as implied by the following proposition.    
Proposition 2. Suppose 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. Under perfect information, the combined quantity 
of the national brand and private label products sold in equilibrium is larger than 
the quantity that would have been sold if the retailer had chosen the product line 
(NB, 0). Moreover, the joint profit of the two firms and the profit of the retailer are 
larger than those if the retailer had chosen the product line (NB, 0).   
Proposition 2 states that with the launch of the PL product, the retailer is able to sell 
more units. Recall that each consumer buys one unit of a good. A larger quantity sold 
means that the retailer has expanded its market reach and sold to more consumers. This, 
in turn, increases the joint profit of the retailer and the NB supplier.   
Proposition 2 suggests an interesting possibility that the NB supplier might actually 
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earn a larger profit when the retailer sells the PL product. While the NB supplier’s share 
of the joint profit declines after the retailer launches the PL product, the resulting increase 
in joint profit might still raise the amount of profit received by the supplier. It turns out, 
however, this is not true in the equilibrium under perfect information.    
Proposition 3. Suppose 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. Under perfect information, the equilibrium profit 
of the NB supplier associated with (NB, PL) is lower than that if the retailer had 
offered the product line (NB, 0).  
Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that under perfect information, the introduction of the 
PL product enlarges the joint profit of the retailer and the NB supplier, but the additional 
profit is reaped by the retailer rather than shared with the supplier. Intuitively, there are 
two forces at play here. The first one is the strengthening of the retailer’s bargaining 
position brought about by the PL product. This force reduces the supplier’s profit. The 
second force is the increase in joint profit, which tends to offset the reduction in profit for 
the supplier. But the magnitude of the second force is dominated by the first one. Hence, 
the supplier’s profit falls.       
4. Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information 
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium under the original assumption that the PL 
product is an experience good, in which case a consumer does not know the quality of the 
PL product when it is introduced in period 1 and she learns its quality in period 2 either 
from her own consumption experience or through word of mouth. In this analysis, we 
suppose that the word-of-mouth effect is so widespread that, if the PL product is sold in 
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period 1 to some consumers, the information about its quality is disseminated to all 
consumers in period 2.9     
The asymmetric information about the quality of the PL product implies that the 
retailer may have an incentive to cheat and misrepresent a low-quality PL product as a 
high-quality one. Accordingly, we need to consider the retailer’s incentive compatibility 
constraint. This constraint may affect the retailer’s choice of product line and prices in 
equilibrium. 
Critical to the incentive compatibility constraint is how consumers would respond in 
period 2 if the retailer cheats in period 1. There are a number of possible ways to model 
the consumers’ response in this situation. For example, we could assume that in period 2 
consumers would continue to shop at this retailer (with the knowledge that the PL 
product is of low quality) in period 2 despite its dishonesty in the previous period. 
Alternatively, we could assume that the retailer’s cheating behavior ruins its reputation 
among its customers, causing some or all of them to stay away from the retailer in period 
2. In other words, consumers would punish the retailer for its cheating behavior.  
In this analysis, we assume that all consumers would boycott the retailer in period 2 if 
it cheats in period 1. This represents the most severe punishment that consumers could 
impose on the retailer. This assumption captures an important element in our theory, 
                                                   
9 The word-of-mount (WOM) effect on sales of consumer products is well documented in the marketing 
literature (see Marchand et al. 2017, and the literature cited therein). With the expansion of electronic 
commerce and social media, the WOM effect is becoming increasingly significant as more and more 
consumers use the Internet to share their experience with the products and services they have purchased. 
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namely, the NB product may be used as a bond to ensure that the retailer sells the 
high-quality PL product. Under this assumption, the retailer who sells low-quality PL 
product in period 1 loses all of its sales of the NB product in period 2.10     
We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept for this model of 
incomplete information. An important element of a PBE is the players’ belief system, 
specifically, the consumers’ beliefs about the quality of the PL product. We assume that 
each consumer formulates her belief in the following way. Let 𝜌 denote a consumer’s 
subjective probability that the PL product is of high quality. If the retailer offers a product 
line that contains the private label in period 1, the consumer will believe that the product 
is of high quality (i.e., 𝜌 ൌ 1) if and only if the prices chosen by the retailer satisfy the 
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint for the high-quality PL product. The IC constraint 
requires that the retailer’s payoff from offering the high-quality PL product be no lower 
than that from selling the low-quality PL product disguised as a high-quality one. If the 
IC constraint is not satisfied, any claim by the retailer about the PL product being of 
high-quality will not be credible and hence will not be believed by consumers, in which 
case 𝜌 ൌ 0.    
Similar to the case of perfect information, we start with an analysis of the three 
continuation games after the retailer’s choice of product line at stage 1. Since consumers 
                                                   
10 An alternative way to capture this idea of the national brand product serving as a bond is to assume that 
the NB supplier would sever its relationship with the retailer in period 2 if the latter cheats in period 1. This 
could arise if the supplier is concerned about damages to its own reputation from dealing with a retailer that 
misrepresents a low-quality product as a high-quality one.    
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observe the product line chosen by the retailer, we can analyze the equilibrium in the 
continuation game associated with each of the three product lines, (0, PL), (NB, 0) and 
(NB, PL), separately.  
Note that asymmetric information about the quality of the PL product affects only the 
product lines (0, PL) and (NB, PL). The product line (NB, 0) does not involve the PL 
product. Hence, the equilibrium in the continuation game associated with this product 
line does not change as we move from perfect information to asymmetric information. 
Therefore, we only need to reconsider the equilibria in the continuation games associated 
with the product lines (0, PL) and (NB, PL).    
4.1 Product Line (0, PL)  
As noted earlier, a consumer will not knowingly purchase a low-quality PL product at 
price above 0. The retailer, for its part, will have no incentive to incur the cost 𝑘 to 
develop the PL product if it expects that it will not be able to sell it at a price above 0 for 
at least one period. Consequently, the retailer will launch the private label only if it can 
convince the consumers, in period 1, that the product is of high quality. To do so, the 
retail prices have to satisfy the IC constraint.  
The preceding discussion implies that a retailer will never choose the low-quality PL 
product in equilibrium. For the low-quality PL product to be profitable, it has to be sold 
at a price above 0 for at least one period. In order to convince consumers to purchase the 
PL product at a price above 0, the retailer has to satisfy the IC constraint. However, if the 
IC constraint is satisfied, the retailer will have no incentive to choose the low-quality 
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product. Therefore, if the retailer chooses a product line that contains the private label in 
equilibrium, the product has to be of high quality.  
In the case where the retailer has chosen the product line (0, PL), the IC constraint 
takes the following form:   
ሺ𝑝ுଵ െ 𝑐ுሻ𝑄ுଵ ൅ 𝛿ሺ𝑝ுଶ െ 𝑐ுሻ𝑄ுଶ ൒ 𝑝ுଵ 𝑄ுଵ .          ሺ23ሻ 
The left-hand side of (23), to be denoted by Πுሺ𝑝ுଵ , 𝑝ுଶ ሻ, is the retailer’s quasi-rent if it 
sells the high-quality PL product at price 𝑝ுଵ  in period 1 and 𝑝ுଶ  in period 2. The 
right-hand side is the retailer’s quasi-rent if it sells a low-quality PL product and manages 
to mislead some consumers into buying the product at the price 𝑝ுଵ  in period 1. But it 
will not be able to sell any unit of the PL product in period 2 as its low quality becomes 
known to all consumers. Therefore, (23) requires that the retailer’s payoff from offering 
the high-quality PL product be at least as high as that from selling the low-quality product 
disguised as the high-quality product.       
At stage three of the game associated with the product line (0, PL), the retailer 
chooses ሺ𝑝ுଵ , 𝑝ுଶ ሻ to maximize its quasi-rent Πுሺ𝑝ுଵ , 𝑝ுଶ ሻ subject to the IC constraint 
(23). Working with the first-order conditions of this constrained optimization problem, 
we find the equilibrium in this continuation game depends on the value of 𝑐ு . 
Specifically, let  
𝑐ுఊ ൌ
𝛿𝑠ு?̅?
2 ൅ 𝛿 .      ሺ24ሻ 
Recalling that 𝑐ுఈ ൌ 𝑠ு?̅?, we can see from (24) that 𝑐ுఊ ൏ 𝑐ுఈ.  
Lemma 2 Under asymmetric information, the retailer sells a positive quantity of 
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high-quality PL product and earns a positive profit from the product line (0, PL) as 
long as 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ. Moreover,  
a) If 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ , the retailer chooses the same price, sells the same quantity of the 
PL product and earns the same level of profit as under perfect information, that 
is, 𝑝ுଵ ൌ 𝑝ுଶ ൌ 𝑝ு∗ , 𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗  and Πு ൌ Πு∗ .  
b) If 𝑐ுఊ ൏ 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ, the retailer chooses a higher price, sells a smaller quantity of 
the PL product and earns a lower level of profit in period 1 than under perfect 
information. Its price, quantity and profit in period 2 are at the same levels as 
those under perfect information. To be more specific, 𝑝ுଵ ൌ ?̂?ு ≡ 𝑝ு∗ ൅ 𝜆𝑐ு 2⁄ , 
𝑝ுଶ ൌ 𝑝ு∗  ; 𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄෠ு ≡ 𝑄ு∗ െ 𝜆𝑐ு 2𝑠ு⁄ , 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗  and Πு ൌ Π෡ு ≡ Πு∗ െ
𝜆ଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ு⁄ , where 
𝜆 ൌ ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻሺ𝑐ு െ 𝑐ு
ఊ ሻ
2𝑐ுଶ ൐ 0.  ሺ25ሻ 
Lemma 2 states that if the unit cost of the high-quality PL product is sufficiently low 
൫𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ ൯, the equilibrium in the continuation game associated with the product line (0, 
PL) is not affected by asymmetric information. In this scenario, the IC constraint is slack 
and hence the retailer faces no temptation to mislead consumers about the quality of the 
PL product. But the temptation to cheat becomes stronger if the marginal cost is higher 
(i.e., if 𝑐ு ൐ 𝑐ுఊ). In this scenario, the retailer has to set its price in period 1 above that 
under perfect information (i.e., ?̂?ு ൐ 𝑝ு∗ ) to satisfy the IC constraint. This reduces the 
quantity of PL product sold in period 1 and leads to a lower level of retail profit than 
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under perfect information (i.e., 𝑄෠ு ൏ 𝑄ு∗  and Π෡ு ൏ Πு∗ ).  
Note that the higher equilibrium price (?̂?ு ൐ 𝑝ு∗ ) in the case 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ serves 
to signal the quality of PL product. Intuitively, the retailer’s temptation to cheat stems 
from the higher profit it would earn from selling the low-quality PL product in period 1. 
By raising the price of the PL product above the level that maximizes its profit under 
perfect information, the retailer sells fewer units in period 1. This, in turn, reduces its 
one-period gain from selling the low-quality product. In other words, by restricting the 
quantity of PL product sold in period 1, the retailer increases the relative importance of 
future profits (in period 2), thus sending a credible signal that the PL product is of high 
quality.    
Another observation from Lemma 2 is that the price and quantity of the PL product 
in period 2 are the same as that under perfect information. This is because once the PL 
product is sold in period 1, all consumers learn its quality in period 2, allowing the 
retailer to choose the same price as the one that maximizes its profit under perfect 
information.  
Recall that (0,PL) is the product line that the retailer would end up if it chooses 
(NB,PL) at stage one but fails to reach an agreement with the NB supplier at stage two of 
the game. Part b) in Lemma 2 suggests that for 𝑐ு ൐ 𝑐ுఊ , the presence of asymmetric 
information decreases the retailer’s disagreement payoff, thus weakening its bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the NB supplier.  
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4.2 Product Line (NB, PL) 
With the product line (NB, PL), the retailer sells both the NB product and the PL product. 
As noted in section 4.1, the retailer will not choose the low-quality PL product in 
equilibrium. Therefore, we only need to analyze the situation where the private label in 
the product line (NB, PL) is of high quality.  
To state the incentive compatibility constraint in this case, let Π஻௅  denote the 
retailer’s quasi-rent if it misrepresents the low-quality product as the high-quality one.  
Then,  
Π஻௅ ൌ ሺ𝑝஻ଵ െ 𝑤ଵሻ𝑄஻ଵ ሺ𝑝஻ଵ , 𝑝ுଵ ሻ ൅ 𝑝ுଵ 𝑄ுଵ ሺ𝑝஻ଵ , 𝑝ுଵ ሻ െ 𝐹ଵ.          ሺ26ሻ 
Note in (26) that the retailer does not earn any profit in period 2. This is because the 
retailer would not be able to sell any unit of either the PL product or the NB product. 
Recall from (17) that Π஻ு is the retailer’s quasi-rent if it sells the high-quality PL 
product along with the NB product. The IC constraint in this case can then be written as 
Π஻ு ൒ Π஻௅.    
As in the case of perfect information, the retailer may set the prices in such a way 
that the demand for one of the products is 0 in equilibrium. With those observations in 
mind, we write the retailer’s optimization problem at stage two as:    
max
௣ಳ೟ ,௣ಹ೟
Π஻ு ൌ ෍ 𝛿௧ିଵሾሺ𝑝஻௧ െ 𝑤௧ሻ𝑄஻௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൅ ሺ𝑝ு௧ െ 𝑐ுሻ𝑄ு௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ െ 𝐹௧ሿ
ଶ
௧ୀଵ
, ሺ27ሻ 
𝑠. 𝑡.  Π஻ு ൒ Π஻௅; 𝑄஻௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൒ 0; 𝑄ு௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൒ 0.    ሺ28ሻ 
At stage two of the game, the retailer and the NB supplier negotiate the terms of 
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contract (𝑤ଵ, 𝐹ଵ, 𝑤ଶ, 𝐹ଶ). Recall that the disagreement point of this bargaining problem is 
that the retailer sells the PL product only. Hence, the payoffs given in Lemma 2 represent 
the retailer’s disagreement payoffs for different values of 𝑐ு. 
Because of the presence of the IC constraint, the analysis of the equilibrium in the 
continuation game associated with this product line under asymmetric information is 
even more intricate than that under perfect information. To conserve space, we relegate 
all details of this analysis to the appendix.11 Here we will make one general observation 
about this case. As in the case of the product line (0, PL), the presence of asymmetric 
information would have no impact on the equilibrium if the unit cost of the PL product is 
sufficiently low, specifically if 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ . In this case, the retailer has no incentive to cheat 
on the quality of the PL product and thus the IC constraint is slack. If the unit cost of PL 
product is higher (i.e., if 𝑐ு ൐ 𝑐ுఊ), however, the IC constraint may become binding and 
consequently the equilibrium price and quantity of the PL product in period 1 may be 
different from their counterparts under perfect information.  
4.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
Based on the analysis of the retailer’s payoffs associated with the three product lines, we 
determine its choice of product line at stage one and the resulting perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. It turns out that in the case where 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ , the equilibrium product line and 
quantities under asymmetric information are the same as those under perfect information 
                                                   
11 In particular, see Lemma A in the appendix for a description of the equilibrium in this continuation 
game.  
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(as presented in Proposition 1). Since our main interest here is in the differences made by 
asymmetric information, we omit the discussions of the PBE associated with 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ  
and focus, instead, on the range of 𝑐ு in the interval ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. 
To present the equilibrium product line for 𝑐ு in this range, we need to define 
another critical value of 𝑐஻. Let.  
  𝑐஻௕ᇱ ൌ 𝑠𝐵𝜃ത െ 𝛿
ሺ𝑠𝐻𝜃ത െ 𝑐𝐻ሻ2
2𝑐𝐻 .       ሺ29ሻ 
It can be shown that 𝑐஻௖ ൏ 𝑐஻௕ ൏ 𝑐஻௕ᇲ ൏ 𝑐஻௔ for 𝑐ு in the range ሺ𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈሻ. 
Proposition 4. Suppose 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. The product line and quantities sold in a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium under asymmetric information depends on the magnitude of 
𝑐஻ as follows.  
a) If 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ, the equilibrium product line is (NB, PL), but the quantity of 
the private label product is zero in both periods. 
b) If 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯, the equilibrium product line is (NB, PL), and the quantities of 
both products are positive in both periods. 
c) If 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇱ൯, the equilibrium product line is (NB, PL), the quantities of 
both products are positive in period 1, but the quantity of the national brand 
product falls to 0 in period 2. 
d) If 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯, the equilibrium product line is (0, PL). 
A comparison Proposition 4 with Proposition 1 shows that the retailer has the same 
types of motives to introduce PL product under asymmetric information as under perfect 
information. Specifically, the retailer uses the PL product to strengthen its bargaining 
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position in the case where the unit cost of the NB product is relatively low (i.e., 𝑐஻ ൑ 𝑐஻௖ ሻ. 
If the unit cost of the NB product is relatively high (i.e., 𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕ᇲ), on the other hand, the 
retailer uses the PL product to replace the NB product. In the case where the unit cost of 
the NB product is in the intermediate range, the launch of the PL product enables the 
retailer to expand the total demand for the goods it carries.  
 
Figure 1: Equilibrium Product Line and Quantity 
 
Note: The equilibrium under asymmetric information illustrated here is for the case  𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. 
 
One notable difference between the equilibria under asymmetric information and 
perfect information can be seen in part c) of Propositions 4. For 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇱ൯, the 
retailer sells positive quantities of both PL product and NB product in period 1, but it 
stops selling the NB product in period 2. What happens in this case is that the retailer 
uses the NB product to assure consumers that the PL product is of high quality in period 1 
and then sells the PL product exclusively once its quality becomes public information in 
period 2. Recall from part c) of Proposition 1 that under perfect information the retailer 
does not carry the NB product for 𝑐஻ in this range. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
the presence of asymmetric information expands the range of 𝑐஻ over which the NB 
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product is offered, from ൫𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௕൯ to ൫𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. 
The impact of asymmetric information goes beyond the expanded range of parameter 
values for which the national brand is offered in equilibrium. It also affects the quantity 
of each product sold under different product lines. As noted above, for 𝑐஻ in the interval 
ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇱ൯, the retailer sells a positive quantity of the NB product in period 1 under 
asymmetric information, while it would have sold no NB product at all under perfect 
information. Moreover, asymmetric information may influence the quantity of each 
product for 𝑐஻ in the interval ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯ as well. Specifically, define another critical value 
of 𝑐஻,  
𝑐஻௖ᇲ ൌ 𝑐஻௕ ൅ 𝑐ு𝛿 െ
√Ω
𝛿𝑠ு ,                   ሺ30ሻ 
where Ω ൌ 𝑠ுଶ ሾ𝛿?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ுሿଶ െ 𝛿𝑠஻𝑠ுሾሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ுଶ ൅ 𝛿𝑠ு?̅?ଶሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሿ. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, this critical value of 𝑐஻ divides the interval ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯ into two 
segments. It turns out that if 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲሻ, the IC constraint is slack and the equilibrium 
quantities of both products in the product line (NB, PL) under asymmetric information 
are the same as those under perfect information. But if 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ሻ, the IC constraint is 
binding and the equilibrium quantity of the PL product is smaller and that of the NB 
product is larger (in period 1) under asymmetric information than those under perfect 
information. More generally, we have the following proposition.   
Proposition 5. Suppose 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. The quantity of the private label product sold is 
no larger, and the quantity of the national brand product sold is no smaller, under 
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asymmetric information than that under perfect information. In particular, the 
quantity of the private label product sold under asymmetric information is smaller 
than that under perfect information if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯. The quantity of the national 
brand product sold under asymmetric information is larger than that under perfect 
information if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯.   
The changes in the quantities of products sold under asymmetric information also 
have an impact on the profits of the two firms. Generally speaking, the presence of 
asymmetric information tends to reduce the profit of the retailer but raise the profit of the 
NB supplier.     
Proposition 6. Suppose 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. The retailer’s profit is lower under asymmetric 
information than under perfect information. On the other hand, the supplier of 
national brand earns a larger profit under asymmetric information than under 
perfect information if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯.   
Intuitively, the retailer’s profit is lower for two reasons. First, asymmetric 
information reduces the retailer’s disagreement payoff and thus weakens its ability to use 
the PL product as a bargaining tool. Second, the need to satisfy the incentive 
compatibility constraint distorts the prices and quantities and thus decreases the joint 
profit for the two firms when a positive quantity of the PL product is sold in equilibrium.  
The latter occurs for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯.   
Proposition 6 indicates that the asymmetric information benefits the NB supplier for 
a wide range of parameter values. Even in situations where the presence of asymmetric 
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information reduces the joint profit, the effect of a smaller pie is overwhelmed by the 
increase in the size of the supplier’s slice, enabling it to earn a larger profit than under 
perfect information.  
Having examined the equilibrium under asymmetric information in comparison with 
that under perfect information, we now zoom in on the case where the retailer chooses the 
product line (NB, PL) and investigate how the introduction of the PL product affects the 
quantities and profits under asymmetric information.  
Proposition 7. Suppose 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯  and 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕ᇲሻ . Under asymmetric 
information, the combined quantity of the national brand and private label products 
sold in equilibrium is larger than the quantity that would have been sold if the 
retailer had chosen the product line (NB, 0). Moreover, the joint profit of the two 
firms and the profit of the retailer are larger than those if the retailer had chosen the 
product line (NB, 0).  
For the range of 𝑐ு and 𝑐஻ specified in Proposition 7, the equilibrium product line 
is (NB, PL) and the retailer sells a positive quantity of the PL product in both periods. 
Under such circumstances, the presence of the PL product in the product line increases 
the total quantity (of two products) sold and raises the joint profit of the retailer and the 
NB supplier. While this result also holds under perfect information (see Proposition 2), its 
implication for the profit of the NB supplier may be different under asymmetric 
information.   
In particular, asymmetric information makes it possible that the supplier of the NB 
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product earns a larger profit when the PL product is sold than if it had not been sold. To 
describe the conditions under which this occurs, we define one more critical value of 𝑐஻: 
𝑐஻௖಩ ൌ 𝑐஻௖ ൅
ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻ
2𝑠ு𝑐ு
ඨ𝛿𝑠஻ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ1 ൅ 𝛿 ሾ2ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ு𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝛿𝑐ு
ଶ െ 𝛿𝑠ுଶ ?̅?ଶሿ.       ሺ31ሻ 
In (31), the expression under the square root is positive for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. It is clear from 
(31) that 𝑐஻௖಩ ൐ 𝑐஻௖ .  
Proposition 8. Suppose 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ and 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯.  Under asymmetric 
information, there exist 𝑆 ൐ 0  and 𝑐஻௕಩ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ᇲሻ  such that for 𝑠஻ ൐ 𝑆  and 
𝑐஻ ∈ ቀ𝑐஻௖಩, 𝑐஻௕಩ቁ,  the supplier of the national brand earns a larger profit with the 
equilibrium product line (NB, PL) than with the alternative product line (NB, 0). 
Proposition 8 delivers the most interesting result in this paper, that is, the introduction 
of the PL product raises, rather than lowers, the profit of the NB supplier under some 
circumstances. Specifically, this occurs for a range of 𝑐஻ if the quality of the product (as 
measured by 𝑠஻) is sufficiently high. Intuitively, the high quality of the NB product 
enables the retailer to charge a high price and earn a large profit from this product. Under 
asymmetric information, this helps the retailer to assure consumers about the quality of 
the PL product: if the retailer misleads consumers in period 1, it will suffer a significant 
loss of profit in period 2 when consumers stop purchasing both products from the retailer. 
This heavy reliance on the NB product weakens the retailer’s ability to use the PL 
product as a bargaining tool against the NB supplier, thus enabling the latter to wrestle a 
larger share of the joint profit from the retailer. Therefore, an interesting implication of 
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this proposition is that suppliers of national brands are more likely to benefit from the 
introduction of private label products if their products are of much higher quality. 
5. Conclusions 
We have studied the impact of introducing a private label product under asymmetric 
information on the profits of a retailer and the supplier of a competing national brand 
product. In particular, we have demonstrated that the introduction of the private label 
product by the retailer is not always detrimental to the interest of the national brand 
supplier. This conclusion is built on two premises. First, the introduction of a private 
label product expands the total demand for the products carried by the retailer and thus 
enlarges the joint profit to be split between the two firms. Second, in an environment 
where consumers do not know the quality of the private label product, the retailer has an 
incentive to misrepresent its quality. This moral hazard problem weakens the retailer’s 
ability to use the private label as a bargaining tool against the national brand supplier. 
Moreover, the presence of the national brand in the retailer’s product line helps alleviate 
the moral hazard problem by serving as a bond to assure consumers that the private label 
product is of high quality. The quality assurance provided by the presence of the national 
brand product enhances the profit generated by the introduction of the private label 
product. This, in conjunction with the weakening of the retailer’s ability to use the private 
label product as a bargaining tool, may enable the national brand supplier to earn a larger 
profit than if the private label product had not been introduced. An interesting implication 
of our findings is that suppliers of national brands are more likely to benefit from the 
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introduction of private label products if their products are of much higher quality. 
To keep our model tractable, we have made a number of simplifying assumptions. 
Among these assumptions, two are particularly notable. First, the game lasts only two 
periods, and second, the quality of the private label product becomes known to all 
consumers in period 2 after it is sold to some consumers in period 1. These assumptions 
are clearly unrealistic and they lead to the result that the retailer needs to signal the 
quality of the private label product for one period only. In reality, a product may be sold 
for many periods and new consumers may enter the market every period. Consequently, 
at any given time there may be some consumers who are not informed about the quality 
of a retailer’s private label product. Accordingly, there may be a need for the retailer to 
signal its quality in every period. It would be an interesting extension to our analysis to 
consider a multi-period model with overlapping cohorts of consumers. It is our conjecture 
that the theory presented in this paper would continue to hold in such a model. But the 
verification of this conjecture is left for future research.   
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: The Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the constrained optimization problem 
(17)-(18) are: 
?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ 2𝑝஻௧ ൅ 2𝑝ு௧ െ 𝑐ு ൅ 𝑤௧ െ 𝜆ଵ௧ ൅ 𝜆ଶ௧ ൌ 0,     ሺ𝐴1ሻ 
2𝑠ு𝑝஻௧ െ 𝑠ு𝑤௧ െ 2𝑠஻𝑝ு௧ ൅ 𝑠஻𝑐ு ൅ 𝑠ு𝜆ଵ௧ െ 𝑠஻𝜆ଶ௧ ൌ 0,    ሺ𝐴2ሻ 
𝑄஻௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൒ 0; 𝑄ு௧ ሺ𝑝஻௧ , 𝑝ு௧ ሻ ൒ 0; 𝜆ଵ௧ ൒ 0; 𝜆ଶ௧ ൒ 0; 𝜆ଵ௧ 𝑄஻௧ ൌ 0; 𝜆ଶ௧ 𝑄ு௧ ൌ 0.     ሺ𝐴3ሻ 
Solving (A1) and (A2), we obtain (19) and (20). Setting 𝑤ଵ ൌ 𝑤ଶ ൌ 𝑐஻ in (19) and (20), we rewrite the 
equilibrium prices as: 
𝑝஻௧ ൌ 𝑠஻?̅?2 ൅
𝑐஻
2 െ
𝜆ଵ௧
2 , 𝑝ு
௧ ൌ 𝑠ு?̅?2 ൅
𝑐ு
2 െ
𝜆ଶ௧
2 .              ሺ𝐴4ሻ 
Substituting (A4) into (16), we find the equilibrium quantities:  
𝑄஻௧ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜆ଵ௧ ൅ 𝜆ଶ௧
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ,   𝑄ு
௧ ൌ 𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜆ଵ
௧ ൅ 𝜆ଶ௧
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ
𝑐ு െ 𝜆ଶ௧
2𝑠ு .   ሺ𝐴5ሻ  
Since the demand for each product is the same over two periods under perfect information, 𝜆ଵଵ ൌ 𝜆ଵଶ and 
𝜆ଶଵ ൌ 𝜆ଶଶ.  
Before we prove each of the three parts of Lemma 1, note that 𝑐஻௔ ൐ 𝑐஻௕ ൐ 𝑐஻௖ ൐ 𝑐ு can be verified using 
their definitions. 
In part a) of this lemma, 𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൌ 0. Complementary slackness conditions in (A3) requires that 
𝜆ଵ௧ ൌ 0 and 𝜆ଶ௧ ൒ 0. Setting 𝑄ு௧ ൌ 0 in (A5), we find  
𝜆ଶ௧ ൌ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝑠ு𝑐஻𝑠஻ .             ሺ𝐴6ሻ 
Then 𝜆ଶ௧ ൒ 0 implies that 𝑐஻ ൑ 𝑐஻௖ . Moreover, 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௔ ensures that 𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0. Therefore, we have 𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0 
and 𝑄ு௧ ൌ 0 for 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ.  
In part b) of this lemma, both 𝑄஻௧  and 𝑄ு௧  are positive. Then (A3) requires that 𝜆ଵ௧ ൌ 0 and 𝜆ଶ௧ ൌ 0. 
Substituting 𝜆ଵ௧ ൌ 0 into (A5), we confirm that 𝑄஻௧ ൐ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൐ 0 for 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕ሻ. For later analysis, 
note that the equilibrium joint profit in this case is  
Π஻ு∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሼ𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ሻሾ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ 𝑐஻ ൅ 𝑐ுሿ ൅ ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻሺ𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுሻሽ
4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ .         ሺ𝐴7ሻ 
In part c) of this lemma, 𝑄஻௧ ൌ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൐ 0. Accordingly, (A3) requires that 𝜆ଵ௧ ൒ 0, 𝜆ଶ௧ ൌ 0. Setting 
𝑄஻௧ ൌ 0 in (A5), we derive 𝜆ଵ௧ ൌ െ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൅ 𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு, from which we verify that 𝜆ଵ௧ ൒ 0 if and only if 
𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕. Moreover, using (A5) we confirm that 𝑄ு௧ ൐ 0 under the assumption 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ. Therefore, we have 
𝑄஻௧ ൌ 0 and 𝑄ு௧ ൐ 0 for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, consider the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ. The retailer’s profits associated with the 
product line (NB, 0), (0, PL) and (NB, PL) are 𝜔Π஻∗ , Πு∗ െ 𝑘 and 𝜔Π஻∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘, respectively. The 
product line (NB, PL) is more profitable than (NB, 0) since ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘 ൐ 0 for a small 𝑘. The product 
line (NB, PL) is more profitable than (0, PL) if  
Π஻∗ െ Πு∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ሻଶ
4𝑠஻ െ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠ு ൐ 0.     ሺ𝐴8ሻ 
Using (A8) we find that 𝜕ሺΠ஻∗ െ Πு∗ ሻ 𝜕𝑐஻ ൏ 0⁄  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ. When 𝑐஻ is at the point 𝑐஻௖ , 
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Π஻∗ െ Πு∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑠஻ሺ𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ሻଶ
4𝑠ுଶ ൐ 0.      ሺ𝐴9ሻ 
This implies that Π஻∗ െ Πு∗ ൐ 0 for all 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ, suggesting that the product line (NB, PL) is more 
profitable than (0, PL) for 𝑐஻ in this interval. Therefore, the retailer earns the highest profit from the product 
line (NB, PL) when 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ. By Lemma 1, the quantity of the PL product is zero for 𝑐஻ in this range.  
In the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕ሻ, the retailer’s profits associated with product line (NB, 0), (0, PL) and (NB, 
PL) are 𝜔Π஻∗ , Πு∗ െ 𝑘  and 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘 , respectively. The product line (NB, PL) is more 
profitable than (NB, 0) if 𝜔ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ ൐ 0. Since 
Π஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுሻଶ
4ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ𝑠஻𝑠ு ൐ 0,    ሺ𝐴10ሻ 
we have 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ ൐ 𝜔Π஻∗ , which implies that the product line (NB, PL) is more profitable than 
(NB, 0) (for a small 𝑘). Moreover, the product line (NB, PL) is more profitable than (0, PL) because 
Π஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሾ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ 𝑐஻ ൅ 𝑐ுሿଶ
4ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ𝑠஻ ൐ 0.   ሺ𝐴11ሻ 
Therefore, the retailer can earn the highest profit from the product line (NB, PL) for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯, and the 
quantities of both products are positive since 𝑐஻௖ ൏ 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௕. 
In the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯, the retailer’s profits associated with product line (NB, 0), (0, PL) and (NB, 
PL) are 𝜔Π஻∗ , Πு∗ െ 𝑘 and Πு∗ െ 𝑘, respectively. Between (NB, PL) and (0, PL) the retailer would choose the 
latter because the retailer does not gain any additional profit from carrying the NB product. Moreover, the 
product line (0, PL) is more profitable than (NB, 0) if Πு∗ െ 𝜔Π஻∗ െ 𝑘 ൒ 0. It can be shown that  
Πு∗ െ Π஻∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠ு െ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ሻଶ
4𝑠஻      ሺ𝐴12ሻ 
is monotonically increasing for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯. At point 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௕, 
Πு∗ െ Π஻∗ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠஻𝑠ு ൐ 0.      ሺ𝐴13ሻ 
This implies that Πு∗ െ Π஻∗ ൐ 0 for all 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯, suggesting that the product line (0, PL) is more 
profitable than (NB, 0) for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯. Therefore, the retailer earns the highest profit from the product line 
(0, PL) when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯. Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: In the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯, the equilibrium product line is (NB, PL) and the 
quantities of both goods are positive. Setting 𝜆ଵ௧ ൌ 𝜆ଶ௧ ൌ 0 in (A5), we obtain the combined quantity of these 
two goods in equilibrium: 
𝑄஻|஻ு∗ ൅ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗ ൌ
?̅?
2 െ
𝑐ு
2𝑠ு .        ሺ𝐴14ሻ 
If the retailer chooses the product line (NB, 0), the equilibrium quantity (of the NB product) is 
𝑄஻∗ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻
2𝑠஻ .         ሺ𝐴15ሻ 
Since 𝑐஻ ൐ 𝑐஻௖ , from (A14) and (A15) we find that 𝑄஻|஻ு∗ ൅ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗ ൐ 𝑄஻∗ ; that is, the combined quantity of 
(NB, PL) is larger than the quantity of (NB, 0). 
Moreover, the joint profits of the two firms from the product line (NB, PL) and (NB,0) are Π஻ு∗  and Π஻∗ , 
respectively. According to Proposition 1 (case b), Π஻ு∗ ൐ Π஻∗  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. The retailer’s profits from the 
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product line (NB, PL) and (NB, 0) are 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘 and 𝜔Π஻∗ , respectively. Since Π஻ு∗ ൐ Π஻∗ , 
we conclude that 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘 ൐ 𝜔Π஻∗  for a small 𝑘; in other words, the retailer’s profit is larger 
with the product line (NB, PL) than with (NB, 0). Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: In the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯, the profits that the NB supplier earns from the product 
line (NB, PL) and (NB, 0) are ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻ு∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗  and ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻∗ , respectively. The former is lower 
than the latter if Π஻∗ െ ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ሻ ൐ 0. It can be verified that 
Π஻∗ െ ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ሻ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሾ?̅?ଶ𝑠஻𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ 𝑠ு𝑐஻ଶ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுଶ ൅ 2𝑠஻𝑐஻𝑐ு െ 2𝑠஻𝑐ு?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሿ
4𝑠஻ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ   ሺ𝐴16ሻ 
is monotonically decreasing for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯ . At 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௕ , Π஻∗ െ ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ/
4𝑠஻ ൐ 0. This implies that Π஻∗ െ ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ሻ ൐ 0 for all 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. Therefore, the profit of the NB 
supplier associated with the product line (NB, PL) is lower than that if the retailer had offered the product line 
(NB, 0) in the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Let 𝜆 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the IC constraint (23).  The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the maximization of the retailer’s quasi-rent Πுሺ𝑝ுଵ , 𝑝ுଶ ሻ (subject to 
the IC constraint (23)) are: 
𝑠ு?̅? െ 2𝑝ுଵ ൅ 𝑐ு ൅ 𝜆𝑐ு ൌ 0,                                    ሺ𝐴17ሻ 
ሺ1 ൅ 𝜆ሻ𝛿ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 2𝑝ுଶ ൅ 𝑐ுሻ ൌ 0,                            ሺ𝐴18ሻ 
Πு െ 𝑝ுଵ 𝑄ுଵ ൒ 0; 𝜆 ൒ 0; 𝜆ሺΠு െ 𝑝ுଵ 𝑄ுଵ ሻ ൌ 0.      ሺ𝐴19ሻ 
Solving (A17) and (A18), we obtain 
𝑝ுଵ ൌ 𝑠ு?̅?2 ൅
𝑐ு
2 ൅
𝜆𝑐ு
2 ; 𝑝ு
ଶ ൌ 𝑠ு?̅?2 ൅
𝑐ு
2 ,            ሺ𝐴20ሻ 
Using the prices in (A20), we rewrite the IC constraint (23) as 
 𝛿𝑠ுଶ ?̅?ଶ െ 2ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑠ு𝑐ு?̅? ൅ ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿 ൅ 2𝜆ሻ𝑐ுଶ ൒ 0.       ሺ𝐴21ሻ 
In the case where the IC constraint is slack, 𝜆 ൌ 0 and both prices in (A20) are equal to 𝑝ு∗ ; in other 
words, the equilibrium is identical to that under perfect information. In this case, (A21) (with 𝜆 ൌ 0) 
becomes  𝛿𝑠ுଶ ?̅?ଶ െ 2ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑠ு𝑐ு?̅? ൅ ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ுଶ ൒ 0,  which holds if 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ .  This proves part a) of 
Lemma 2.    
In the case where 𝜆 ൐ 0, the IC constraint is binding and thus (A21) holds with equality. Solving (A21) 
for 𝜆, we obtain 
𝜆 ൌ െሾ𝛿𝑠ு?̅? െ ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ுሿሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻ2𝑐ுଶ .        ሺ𝐴22ሻ 
Since 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑠ு?̅?ሺ≡ 𝑐ுఈሻ, (A22) implies that 𝑐ு ൐ 𝑐ுఊ  is needed to satisfy 𝜆 ൐ 0. Moreover, for the quantity of 
the PL in period 1 to be positive, we need  
𝑄෠ுଵ ൌ 𝛿
ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠ு𝑐ு ൐ 0,        ሺ𝐴23ሻ 
which always holds. Therefore, in the case where 𝑐ுఊ ൏ 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ, we have 𝑝ுଵ ൌ ?̂?ு, 𝑝ுଶ ൌ 𝑝ு∗ , 𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄෠ு, and 
𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗ . Using the equilibrium prices and quantities, we find Πு ൌ Π෡ு. This proves part b) of Lemma 2.  
Q.E.D. 
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Lemma A and its Proof:  
Lemma A. Under asymmetric information, the prices and quantities sold in the equilibrium of the continuation 
game associated with the product line (NB, PL) depend on the values of 𝑐ு and 𝑐஻. If 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ , the 
equilibrium prices and quantities of the two products are the same as those under perfect information for 
𝑐஻ in the relevant intervals. If 𝑐ுఊ ൏ 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ, on the other hand, the equilibrium prices and quantities 
depend on the value of 𝑐஻ as follows.  
a) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ, 𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 0 and 𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻ଶ ൐ 0; that is, the quantity of the 
private label product sold is 0 while the quantity of the national brand product sold is positive in both 
periods. Moreover, the equilibrium prices and quantities of the national brand product in both periods 
are the same as those under perfect information. 
b) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯, 𝑄ுଵ ൐ 0, 𝑄஻ଵ ൐ 0, 𝑄ுଶ ൐ 0, and 𝑄஻ଶ ൐ 0; that is, the quantities 
sold are positive for both the private label and national brand product in both periods. Moreover, the 
equilibrium prices and quantities of the two products in both periods are the same as those under 
perfect information if 𝑐஻ is in the range ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯.  
c) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሾ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲሻ, 𝑄ுଵ ൐ 0, 𝑄஻ଵ ൐ 0, 𝑄ுଶ ൐ 0, but 𝑄஻ଶ ൌ 0; that is, the quantity of 
the private label product sold is positive in both periods, but the quantity of the national brand 
product sold is positive in period 1 only. Moreover, the equilibrium price of the private label product 
and quantities of the two products in period 1 are different from those under perfect information. 
d) In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሾ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔ሻ, 𝑄ுଵ ൐ 0, 𝑄ுଶ ൐ 0 and 𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻ଶ ൌ 0; that is, the quantity of the 
private label product sold is positive while the quantity of the national brand product sold is 0 in both 
periods. Moreover, the equilibrium price and quantity of the private label product in period 1 are 
different from those under perfect information.  
 
Proof: The prices and quantities sold in the equilibrium of the continuation game associated with the product 
line (NB, PL) are solved from the retailer’s optimization problem (27)-(28). The Lagrange function associated 
with this problem is 
𝐿ሺ𝑝஻ଵ , 𝑝ுଵ , 𝑝஻ଶ, 𝑝ுଶ , 𝜇ଵ, 𝜇ଶ, 𝜇ଷ, 𝜇ସ, 𝜇ହሻ ൌ 𝜋஻ு ൅ 𝜇ଵሺ𝜋஻ு െ 𝜋஻௅ሻ ൅ 𝜇ଶ𝑄஻ଵ ൅ 𝜇ଷ𝑄ுଵ ൅ 𝜇ସ𝑄஻ଶ ൅ 𝜇ହ𝑄ுଶ .  ሺ𝐴24ሻ 
Solving the first-order conditions with respect to 𝑝஻ଵ , 𝑝ுଵ , 𝑝஻ଶ and 𝑝ுଶ  yields 
𝑝஻ଵ ൌ 𝑠஻?̅?2 ൅
𝑐஻
2 െ
𝜇ଶ
2 , 𝑝ு
ଵ ൌ 𝑠ு?̅?2 ൅
𝑐ு
2 ൅
𝜇ଵ𝑐ு
2 െ
𝜇ଷ
2 ,         ሺ𝐴25ሻ 
𝑝஻ଶ ൌ 𝑠஻?̅?2 ൅
𝑐஻
2 െ
𝜇ସ
2𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ , 𝑝ு
ଶ ൌ 𝑠ு?̅?2 ൅
𝑐ு
2 െ
𝜇ହ
2𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ.         ሺ𝐴26ሻ 
Substituting the prices in (A25) and (A26) into the demand functions, we have 
𝑄஻ଵ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଶ ൅ 𝜇ଷ
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ,                         ሺ𝐴27ሻ 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଶ𝑠ு ൅ 𝜇ଷ𝑠஻2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ,          ሺ𝐴28ሻ 
𝑄஻ଶ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ସ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ ൅
𝜇ହ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ,           ሺ𝐴29ሻ 
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𝑄ுଶ ൌ
𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ସ𝑠ு𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ ൅
𝜇ହ𝑠஻𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ
2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ .          ሺ𝐴30ሻ 
The IC constraint becomes 
𝜋஻ு െ 𝜋஻௅ ൌ െ 𝑐ு
ሺ𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଶ𝑠ு ൅ 𝜇ଷ𝑠஻ሻ
2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ  
൅
𝛿 ൤𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ െ 𝜇ସ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ൨ ൤?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ 𝑐஻ ൅ 𝑐ு ൅
𝜇ସ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ െ
𝜇ହ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ൨
4ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ  
൅
𝛿 ൤𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ହ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ൨ ൤𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ
𝜇ସ𝑠ு𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ ൅
𝜇ହ𝑠஻𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ൨
4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൒ 0.          ሺ𝐴31ሻ 
Lemma A lists four different cases in terms of the quantities of the two products in each of the two periods. 
In the ensuing proof, we use (A27)-(A31) to find out the ranges of 𝑐ு and 𝑐஻ for which each of the four 
cases would arise. We will also note the conditions under which the equilibrium quantities and prices are the 
same as those under perfect information.  
In the case where the quantity of the NB product is positive and the quantity of the PL product is zero in 
both periods, 𝜇ଶ ൌ 𝜇ସ ൌ 0; 𝜇ଷ ൒ 0, 𝜇ହ ൒ 0 and solving (A28) and (A30) we have 
𝜇ଵ𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଷ ൌ 𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு𝑠஻ ,         ሺ𝐴32ሻ 
𝜇ହ
𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ ൌ െ
𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு
𝑠஻ .     ሺ𝐴33ሻ 
Since 𝜇ଵ ൒ 0 and 𝜇ହ ൒ 0, (A33) implies that 𝑐஻ ൑ 𝑐஻௖ . If the IC constraint is slack and hence 𝜇ଵ ൌ 0, (A32) 
also entails 𝑐஻ ൑ 𝑐஻௖ . Moreover, (A27) and (A29) imply that 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௔ . In this case, (A31) becomes 
ሾ𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ሻଶሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሿ 𝑠஻⁄ ൐ 0 which is satisfied because 𝑠஻ ൐ 𝑠ு and 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௔. If the IC constraint is 
binding, 𝜇ଵ ൐ 0. Substituting (A32) and (A33) into (A27) and (A29), respectively, we have 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௔. On the 
other hand, the binding (A31) entails 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑠஻?̅?ሺ≡ 𝑐஻௔ሻ, which contradicts the condition 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௔. This implies 
that the IC constraint is always slack in the case where the quantity of the NB product is positive and the 
quantity of the PL product is zero in both periods. Therefore, in the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ, we have 
𝑝஻ଵ ൌ 𝑝஻ଶ ൌ 𝑝஻∗  and the prices of the PL are given in (A25) and (A26), 𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻ଶ ൌ 𝑄஻∗  and 𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 0. 
Using the equilibrium prices and quantities, we find the equilibrium joint profit in this case is Π஻∗ . This proves 
part a) of Lemma A. 
In part b) of Lemma A, the quantities of both products are positive in both periods, in which case 
𝜇ଶ ൌ 𝜇ଷ ൌ 𝜇ସ ൌ 𝜇ହ ൌ 0. Solving (A27)-(A30) yields 
𝑄஻ଵ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑐ு
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0,                       ሺ𝐴34ሻ 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑠஻𝑐ு2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0,                  ሺ𝐴35ሻ 
𝑄஻ଶ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0,                                 ሺ𝐴36ሻ 
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𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0.                                     ሺ𝐴37ሻ 
(A36) and (A37) imply that 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯.  
If the IC constraint is slack and hence 𝜇ଵ ൌ 0, (A34) and (A35) also imply that 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. In this 
case, (A31) becomes 𝛿𝑠ு𝑐஻ଶ െ 2𝑠ு𝑐஻ሾ𝛿?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ுሿ ൅ 𝑠஻ሾሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ுଶ ൅ 𝛿𝑠ு?̅?ଶሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሿ ൐ 0 . 
This inequality holds for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯ when 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ  and for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯ when 𝑐ுఊ ൏ 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ, where 
𝑐஻௖ᇲ is defined in (30). Note that when the IC constraint is slack, the quantities of both products in both periods 
are the same as those under perfect information. The above analysis shows that this is true under each of the 
following circumstances: (i) 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ  and 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯; (ii) 𝑐ுఊ ൏ 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ, and 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯. 
If the IC constraint is binding, 𝜇ଵ ൐ 0 and (A31) holds with equality. Solving (A31) we obtain 
𝜇ଵ ൌ
ሺ𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுሻሾሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ு െ 𝛿𝑠ு?̅?ሿ െ 𝛿𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻?̅? െ 𝑐஻ሻሾ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ 𝑐஻ ൅ 𝑐ுሿ
2𝑠஻𝑐ுଶ .     ሺ𝐴38ሻ 
(A34) and (A35) imply that 
െ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൅ 𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு
𝑐ு ൏ 𝜇ଵ ൏
𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு
𝑠஻𝑐ு .     ሺ𝐴39ሻ 
Conditions (A38)-(A39), along with 𝜇ଵ ൐ 0, entail 𝑐ுఊ ൏ 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ and 𝑐஻௖ᇲ ൏ 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௕. Within these ranges of 
parameter values, the quantities of both products are positive in both periods. Because of the binding IC 
constraint, however, we have 𝑄஻ଵ ൐ 𝑄஻|஻ு∗ , 𝑄ுଵ ൏ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗ . For later analysis, note that the equilibrium joint 
profit in this case is Π෡஻ு ൌ Π஻ு∗ െ 𝜇ଵଶ𝑠஻𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ .  
In the case where the quantity of the NB is positive in period 1 and zero in period 2 and the quantity of the 
PL is positive in both periods, 𝜇ଶ ൌ 𝜇ଷ ൌ 𝜇ହ ൌ 0 and 𝜇ସ ൒ 0. Substituting these values into (A27)-(A30), we 
find 
𝑄஻ଵ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑐ு
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0,                  ሺ𝐴40ሻ 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑠஻𝑐ு2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0,             ሺ𝐴41ሻ 
𝑄஻ଶ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ସ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൌ 0,         ሺ𝐴42ሻ 
𝑄ுଶ ൌ
𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ସ𝑠ு𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ
2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0.        ሺ𝐴43ሻ 
(A42) and (A43) imply that 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ. Suppose the IC constraint is slack. Setting 𝜇ଵ ൌ 0 in (A40), we find 
𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௕. Solving (A42), we obtain 𝜇ସ ൌ െ𝛿ሾ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ െ 𝑐஻ ൅ 𝑐ுሿ, which has a negative sign if 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௕. 
Therefore, a slack IC constraint is not possible in this case. Now suppose the IC constraint is binding, in which 
case 𝜇ଵ ൐ 0 and (A31) holds with equality. Solving (A31), we obtain 
𝜇ଵ ൌ 2𝑐ு
ሺ𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுሻ െ 𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
2𝑠஻𝑐ுଶ .       ሺ𝐴44ሻ 
From (A44), we see that 𝜇ଵ ൐ 0 implies 𝑐஻ ൐ ሾ𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ ൅ 2𝑠஻𝑐ுଶ ሿ 2𝑠ு𝑐ு⁄ , which holds for 
𝑐ு ൐ 𝑐ுఊ . Substituting (A44) into (A40), we find that 𝑐஻ ൏ 𝑐஻௕ᇱ for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯, where 𝑐஻௕ᇱ is defined in 
(29). Substituting (A44) into (A41), we obtain െ𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ ൏ 0, which always holds. Moreover, 
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Using (A44) to solve (A42), we find 𝜇ସ ൌ 𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻሾെ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൅ 𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ுሿ, and 𝜇ସ ൒ 0 implies that 
𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕ . Therefore, when 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯  and 𝑐஻ ∈ ሾ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲሻ , 𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻|஻ு∗ ൅ 𝜇ଵሾ𝑐ு 2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ሿ ൐ 0  and 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗ െ 𝜇ଵ𝑠஻ሾ𝑐ு 2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ሿ ൐ 0, 𝑄஻ଶ ൌ 0 and 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗ . This proves part c) of Lemma A. For 
later analysis, note that the equilibrium joint profit in this case is equal to ሺΠ஻ு∗ ൅ 𝛿Πு∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ െ
𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ . 
In the case where the quantity of the NB product is zero and the quantity of the PL product is positive in 
both periods, 𝜇ଷ ൌ 𝜇ହ ൌ 0 and 𝜇ଶ ൒ 0, 𝜇ସ ൒ 0. Substituting these values into (A27)-(A30) to find 
𝑄஻ଵ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଶ
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൌ 0,                   ሺ𝐴45ሻ 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଶ𝑠ு2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0,          ሺ𝐴46ሻ 
𝑄஻ଶ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ସ𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ
2ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൌ 0,                     ሺ𝐴47ሻ 
𝑄ுଶ ൌ
𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝜇ସ𝑠ு𝛿ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ
2𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൐ 0.                   ሺ𝐴48ሻ 
Suppose the IC constraint is slack and hence 𝜇ଵ ൌ 0. Solving for 𝜇ଶ from (A45) and 𝜇ସ from (A47), we find 
that both 𝜇ଶ ൒ 0 and 𝜇ସ ൒ 0 imply 𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕. From (A46) and (A48) we conclude that 𝑐ு ൏ 𝑐ுఈ. Moreover, 
(A31) becomes ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻሾെ2𝑐ு ൅ 𝛿ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻሿ ൒ 0, which implies that 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ . Therefore, 𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻ଶ ൌ
0 and 𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗  if 𝑐ு ൑ 𝑐ுఊ  and 𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕. 
Now suppose the IC constraint is binding. Then (A31) holds with equality and 𝜇ଵ ൐ 0. Solving (A31) to 
find that  
𝜇ଵ ൌ െ𝛿
ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ ൅ 2𝑐ுሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻ
2𝑐ுଶ ൐ 0      ሺ𝐴49ሻ 
implies 𝑐ு ൐ 𝑐ுఊ . From (A45) we obtain 𝜇ଶ ൌ െ?̅?ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ ൅ 𝑐஻ െ 𝑐ு െ 𝜇ଵ𝑐ு , and 𝜇ଶ ൒ 0 implies that 
𝑐஻ ൒ 𝑐஻௕ᇲ. Substituting the preceding expression of 𝜇ଶ into (A46), we obtain 𝜇ଵ ൏ ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻ 𝑐ு⁄ . The latter 
is satisfied by (A49). Solving 𝜇ସ ሺ1 ൅ 𝜇ଵሻ⁄  from (A47) substituting it into (A48), we find 𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗ . 
Therefore, when 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯  and 𝑐஻ ∈ ሾ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔ሻ , 𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻ଶ ൌ 0 , 𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ு∗ െ 𝜇ଵ𝑐ு 2𝑠ு⁄ ൐ 0  and 
𝑄ுଶ ൌ 𝑄ு∗ . This proves part d) of Lemma A. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: We determine the equilibrium product line by comparing the retailer’s profits 
associated with the three product lines: (NB, 0), (NB, PL) and (0, PL). The retailer’s profit associated with (NB, 
0) is 𝜔Π஻∗ , where Π஻∗  is given in (15). Its profit associated with (0, PL) is Π෡ு െ 𝑘, where Π෡ு can be found 
in Lemma 2b). As indicated in Lemma A, the retailer’s profit associated with (NB, PL) depends on the value of 
𝑐஻. 
First, consider the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ. By part a) of Lemma A, the quantity of the PL product sold 
is zero in both periods if the retailer chooses the product line (NB, PL). Accordingly, the retailer’s profit 
associated with this product line is 𝜔Π஻∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘. This product line is more profitable than (NB, 0) 
because ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 ൐ 0 for a small 𝑘. Moreover, (NB, PL) is more profitable than (0, PL) if 𝜔ሺΠ஻∗ െ
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Πு∗ ሻ െ 𝑘 ൐ 0. As noted in the proof of Proposition 1, Π஻∗ ൐ Πு∗  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ. Therefore, the retailer earns 
the largest profit from (NB, PL) in this case, and the quantity of the PL sold is zero in both periods. 
In the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯, we need to consider the following two sub-cases: (i) 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯, and (ii) 
𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯. As shown in the proof of Lemma A, if the retailer chooses the product line (NB, PL) in the first 
sub-case, the quantities sold are equal to those under perfect information. Accordingly, its profit associated 
with this product line is 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘. Recall that the retailer’s profits associated with (NB, 0) and 
(0, PL) are 𝜔Π஻∗  and Π෡ு െ 𝑘 , respectively. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, Π஻ு∗ ൐ Π஻∗  and 
Π஻ு∗ ൐ Πு∗  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯. Combining these results with the observation Πு∗ ൐ Π෡ு, we conclude that the 
retailer earns the largest profit from (NB, PL) in this case and the quantities of both products are positive in 
both periods.  
In the second sub-case, the quantities associated with product line (NB, PL) are not the same as those 
under perfect information. Accordingly, the retailer’s profit associated with this product line is 𝜔Π෡஻ு ൅
ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘. The retailer’s profits associated with (NB, 0) and (0, PL) are the same as those specified 
above. Hence, (NB, PL) is more profitable than (0, PL) if Π෡஻ு ൐ Π෡ு. Using the results from the proofs of 
Lemma 1 and Lemma A, we can show that,  
Π෡஻ு െ Π෡ு ൌ Π஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ൅ 𝐹ሺ𝑐஻ሻ with 𝐹ሺ𝑐஻ሻ ൌ 𝜆
ሺ𝑐஻ሻଶ𝑐ுଶ
4𝑠ு െ
𝑠஻𝜇ଵሺ𝑐஻ሻଶ𝑐ுଶ
4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ.          ሺ𝐴50ሻ 
It can be shown that 𝐹ᇱሺ𝑐஻ሻ ൏ 0  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯,  and ൫𝑐஻௕൯ ൌ ሾሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻ 𝑐ு⁄ ሿଶሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻଶ 
ቂ൫𝑐ு െ 𝑐ுఊ ൯ଶ 16𝑠஻ൗ ቃ ൐ 0. They imply that 𝐹ሺ𝑐஻ሻ ൐ 0 for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯. From Proposition 1, we know that 
Π஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ൐ 0 for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯. Then from (A50) we conclude that Π෡஻ு െ Π෡ு ൐ 0 for 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ሻ. 
This proves that (NB, PL) is more profitable than (0, PL) in this sub-case. On the other hand, (NB, PL) is more 
profitable than (NB, 0) if 𝜔൫Π෡஻ு െ Π஻∗ ൯ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 ൐ 0. It can be shown that 𝜕൫Π෡஻ு െ Π஻∗ ൯ 𝜕𝑐஻⁄ ൌ
െ 𝛿𝑠ு൫𝑐஻௕ െ 𝑐஻൯ 𝑐ு⁄ ൏ 0  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௕൯.  Moreover, when 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௕, Π෡஻ு െ Π஻∗ ൌ ?̅?ሺ4 ൅ 𝛿ሻ 
ሾ1 െ𝛿𝑠ு ሺ4 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ ሿሾሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଷ 16𝑠஻𝑠ு𝑐ுଶ⁄ ሿ ൐ 0. Thus, we can infer that Π෡஻ு െ Π஻∗ ൐ 0 for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯. 
This, in turn, implies that (NB, PL) is more profitable than (NB, 0) for a small 𝑘. Therefore, the retailer earns 
the largest profit from (NB, PL) when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯. 
In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯, the retailer’s profits associated with (NB, 0), (NB, PL) and (0, PL) are 
𝜔Π஻∗ ,  𝜔Π෡஻ு ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘  and Π෡ு െ 𝑘 , respectively. Moreover, Π෡஻ு  in this case is 
ሺΠ஻ு∗ ൅ δΠு∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுଶ 𝜇ଵଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ , where the expression of 𝜇ଵ is provided in the proof of 
Lemma A. (NB, PL) is more profitable than (0, PL) if ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ ൅ 𝜆ଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ு⁄ െ 
𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ൐ 0. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, Π஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ൐ 0. Furthermore, it can be 
shown that 𝜆ଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ு⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄  is decreasing in 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯ , and at 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௕ᇲ , 
𝜆ଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ு⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ൌ 0 . They imply that 𝜆ଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ு⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ൐ 0  for 
𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. Hence, (NB, PL) is more profitable than (0, PL) for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. Note that (NB, PL) is more 
profitable than (NB, 0) if 𝜔ሾሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ൅ ሺΠு∗ െ Π஻∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ ሿ ൅
ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 ൐ 0 . It can be shown that 𝜕ሾሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ሿ 𝜕𝑐஻⁄ ൌ 
െ 𝛿𝑠ுሾሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ?̅? െ 𝑐஻ ൅ 𝑐ுሿ 𝑐ு⁄ ൐ 0  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. At 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௕ ,   ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ െ 
𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ൌ ሺ4 ൅ 𝛿ሻ ?̅?ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଷሾ1 െ 𝛿𝑠ு ሺ4 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ ሿ 16𝑠஻𝑠ு𝑐ுଶ⁄ ൐ 0. Thus, for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯, 
ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ൐ 0 . Moreover, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1, 
Πு∗ െ Π஻∗ ൐ 0. These observations imply that Π෡஻ு ൐ Π஻∗ .  Since ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 ൐ 0 for a small 𝑘, we 
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conclude that (NB, PL) is more profitable than (NB, 0). Therefore, the retailer earns the largest profit from (NB, 
PL) when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. 
In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯, the retailer would sell 0 units of the NB product even if chooses the 
product line (NB, PL). Consequently, its profit associated with (NB, PL) is Π෡ு െ 𝑘, the same as that with (0, 
PL). Since the retailer does not gain any additional profit from carrying the NB product, the retailer chooses (0, 
PL) over (NB, PL). In comparison with the profit associated with (0, NB), note that Π෡ு െ Π஻∗  is increasing in 
𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯, and at 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௕ᇲ, Π෡ு െ Π஻∗ ൌ 𝛿ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ ሾ2𝑠஻𝑐ு െ 𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ ൅ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻሿ 16𝑠஻𝑠ு𝑐ுଶ⁄ ൐
0. These imply that (0, PL) is more profitable than (NB, 0) for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯. Therefore, the retailer earns the 
largest profit from (0, PL) when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Since the quantities sold in the second period under asymmetric information are the 
same as those under perfect information, we need to analyze the difference in quantities in the first period only.  
Consider the quantity of the PL product. When 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ሻ, the first period equilibrium quantity of the 
PL product is represented by (A35), which can be rewritten as: 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗ െ
ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑐஻ െ 𝑐஻௖ ሻ൫𝑐ு െ 𝑐ுఊ ൯ െ 𝛿ሺ𝑐஻௔ െ 𝑐஻ሻ൫𝑐஻௕ െ 𝑐஻൯
4ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ𝑐ு .          ሺ𝐴51ሻ 
From (A51), we find that 𝑄ுଵ ൏ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗  for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ and 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯. When 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯, the first 
period equilibrium quantity of the PL product is given by (A41), which can be rewritten as 
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗ െ
2𝑠ு𝑐ுሺ𝑐஻ െ 𝑐஻௖ ሻ െ 𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑐ுఈ െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ𝑐ு .                       ሺ𝐴52ሻ 
Using (A52), we can show that 𝑄ுଵ ൏ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗  for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ and 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. From the last paragraph 
in the proof of Lemma A, we see that when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕ᇱ, 𝑐஻௔൯, the equilibrium quantity of the PL product in 
period 1 is  
𝑄ுଵ ൌ 𝑄ு∗ െ
ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑐ுఈ െ 𝑐ுሻ൫𝑐ுఊ െ 𝑐ு൯
4𝑠ு𝑐ு ,           ሺ𝐴53ሻ 
which is smaller than 𝑄ு∗  for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. Therefore, the quantity of the PL product sold under asymmetric 
information is smaller than that under perfect information if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯. As noted in the proof of 
Proposition 4, when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯ the quantity of the PL product sold under asymmetric information is the 
same as that under perfect information. 
Next, consider the quantity of the NB product. In the case of 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ ᇱ, 𝑐஻௕൯, the first period equilibrium 
quantity of the NB is given by (A34), which can be rewritten as 
𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 𝑄஻|஻ு∗ ൅
𝑠ுൣሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑐஻ െ 𝑐஻௖ ሻ൫𝑐ு െ 𝑐ுఊ ൯ െ 𝛿ሺ𝑐஻௔ െ 𝑐஻ሻ൫𝑐஻௕ െ 𝑐஻൯൧
4𝑠஻ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ𝑐ு .        ሺ𝐴54ሻ 
From (A54) we find that 𝑄஻ଵ ൐ 𝑄஻|஻ு∗  for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ and 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯ . When 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇱ൯ , the 
equilibrium quantity of the NB product in period 1 is represented by (A40), which can be rewritten as 
𝑄஻ଵ ൌ 2𝑠ு𝑐ு
ሺ𝑐஻ െ 𝑐஻௖ ሻ െ 𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑐ுఈ െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠஻ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ𝑐ு .         ሺA55ሻ 
From (A55) we find that 𝑄஻ଵ ൐ 0 for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ and 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. Recalling that for this range of 
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parameter values the quantity of the NB product is 0 under perfect information, we conclude that 𝑄஻ଵ ൐ 𝑄஻∗  in 
this case. Therefore, the quantity of the NB sold under asymmetric information is larger than that under perfect 
information if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯. As noted in the proofs of Lemma A and Proposition 4, the quantity of the NB 
product sold under asymmetric information is the same as that under perfect information if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯ and 
if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: For ease of comparison, in Table A1 we present the retailer’s profits under perfect and 
asymmetric information for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ and 𝑐஻ in different intervals. Since Π෡ு ൏ Πு∗  and Π෡஻ு ൏ Π஻ு∗  
for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯, it is straightforward to show that the retailer earns a smaller profit under asymmetric 
information than under perfect information for 𝑐஻ in the intervals ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ, (𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲሿ, ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ሻ and ൣ𝑐஻௕ᇲ, 𝑐஻௔൯. 
When 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯, the retailer earns a larger profit under perfect information if Πு∗ ൐ 𝜔Π෡஻ு ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு. 
Recall from the proof of Proposition 4 that Π෡஻ு ൌ ሺΠ஻ு∗ ൅ δΠு∗ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻ⁄ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுଶ 𝜇ଵଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ , which is 
less than Πு∗  because Π஻ு∗ ൏ Πு∗  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௔൯. This, in conjunction with Πு∗ ൐ Π෡ு, implies that the 
retailer’s profit is larger under perfect information than under asymmetric information when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇱ൯. 
 
Table A1 The Retailer’s Profits 
𝒄𝑩 Profits under perfect information Profits under asymmetric information 
ሺ𝒄𝑯, 𝒄𝑩𝒄 ሿ 𝜔Π஻∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘 𝜔Π஻∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 
൫𝒄𝑩𝒄 , 𝒄𝑩𝒄 ᇱ൧  𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 
൫𝒄𝑩𝒄ᇲ, 𝒄𝑩𝒃 ൯ 𝜔Π஻ு∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗ െ 𝑘 𝜔Π෡஻ு ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 
ൣ𝒄𝑩𝒃 , 𝒄𝑩𝒃ᇲ൯ Πு∗ െ 𝑘 𝜔Π෡஻ு ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு െ 𝑘 
ൣ𝒄𝑩𝒃ᇲ, 𝒄𝑩𝒂 ൯ Πு∗ െ 𝑘 Π෡ு െ 𝑘 
 
Table A2 The NB Supplier’s Profits 
𝒄𝑩 Profits under perfect information Profits under asymmetric information 
ሺ𝒄𝑯, 𝒄𝑩𝒄 ሿ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗  ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு 
൫𝒄𝑩𝒄 , 𝒄𝑩𝒄 ᇱ൧  ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻ு∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗  ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻ு∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு 
൫𝒄𝑩𝒄ᇲ, 𝒄𝑩𝒃 ൯ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻ு∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠு∗  ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡஻ு െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு 
ൣ𝒄𝑩𝒃 , 𝒄𝑩𝒃ᇲ൯ 0 ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡஻ு െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு 
 
In Table A2 are the NB supplier’s profits for 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯ and 𝑐஻ in different intervals. Using the same 
logic as above, we can show that the NB supplier earns a larger profit under asymmetric information than 
under perfect information for 𝑐஻ in the intervals ሺ𝑐ு, 𝑐஻௖ ሿ and (𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲሿ. When 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯, the NB supplier 
earns larger profit under asymmetric information if 𝜆ଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ு⁄ െ Π෡஻ு െ Π෡ு െ ሺΠ஻ு∗ െ Πு∗ ሻ ൐ 0. By (A50), 
this inequality is equivalent to 𝑠஻𝜇ଵଶ𝑐ுଶ 4𝑠ுሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ⁄ ൐ 0, which is shown to be true in the proof of 
Proposition 4. Thus the supplier’s profit is larger under asymmetric information than under perfect information 
when 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯ . When 𝑐஻ ∈ ൣ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲ൯ , the NB supplier earns a larger profit under asymmetric 
information than under perfect information because, by Proposition 4, Π෡஻ு െ Π෡ு ൐ 0. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7: As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, the equilibrium quantities under asymmetric 
information are the same as those under perfect information if 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯. In this case, the combined 
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quantity of the two products in each period associated with (NB, PL) is equal to 𝑄஻|஻ு∗ ൅ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗  given in 
(A14). The total quantity associated with (NB, 0), on the other hand, is equal to 𝑄஻∗  in (A15). Since 𝑐஻ ൐ 𝑐஻௖ , 
from (A14) and (A15) we find that 𝑄஻|஻ு∗ ൅ 𝑄ு|஻ு∗ ൐ 𝑄஻∗ ; that is, the combined quantity of (NB, PL) is larger 
than the quantity of (NB, 0). The joint profit associated with (NB, PL) and (NB, 0) are Π஻ு∗  and Π஻∗ , 
respectively. Eq. (A10) shows that the former is larger than the latter. 
For the remaining cases, we need to consider only the quantities in period 1 because the quantities in 
period 2 under asymmetric information are the same as those under perfect information. In the case where 
𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯, the combined quantity in period 1 of the two products associated with (NB, PL) is obtained by 
adding (A34) to (A35) and using (A38) to replace 𝜇ଵ:  
𝑄஻ଵ ൅ 𝑄ுଵ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐ு
2𝑠ு െ
ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑐஻ െ 𝑐஻௖ ሻ൫𝑐ு െ 𝑐ுఊ ൯ െ 𝛿ሺ𝑐஻௔ െ 𝑐஻ሻ൫𝑐஻௕ െ 𝑐஻൯
4𝑠஻𝑠ு𝑐ு .         ሺ𝐴56ሻ 
It can be shown that (𝑄஻ଵ ൅ 𝑄ுଵ )െ𝑄஻∗  is a decreasing function in 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯, and at 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௕, ሺ𝑄஻ଵ ൅ 𝑄ுଵ ሻ െ
𝑄஻∗ ൌ 𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ 4𝑠஻𝑠ு𝑐ு⁄ ൐ 0. This implies that 𝑄஻ଵ ൅ 𝑄ுଵ ൐ 𝑄஻∗  for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕൯. Regarding 
the joint profit associated with (NB, PL) and (NB, 0), we have shown in the proof of Proposition 4 that 
Π෡஻ு ൐ Π஻∗  in this case. 
In the case where 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௕, 𝑐஻௕ᇲሿ, the combined quantity in period 1 of the two products associated with 
(NB, PL) is obtained by adding (A40) to (A41) and using (A44) to replace 𝜇ଵ: 
𝑄஻ଵ ൅ 𝑄ுଵ ൌ ?̅?2 െ
𝑐ு
2𝑠ு െ
2𝑠ு𝑐ுሺ𝑐஻ െ 𝑐஻௖ ሻ െ 𝛿ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑐ுఈ െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠஻𝑠ு𝑐ு .        ሺ𝐴57ሻ 
Using (A57) and (14), we can show that ሺ𝑄஻ଵ ൅ 𝑄ுଵ ሻ െ 𝑄஻∗ ൌ 𝛿 ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑐ுఈ െ 𝑐ுሻଶ 4𝑠஻𝑠ு𝑐ு⁄ ൐ 0 . 
Regarding the joint profit associated with (NB, PL) and (NB, 0), it is demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 
4 that Π෡஻ு ൐ Π஻∗  in this case. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 8: We prove this result by comparing the supplier’s profits associated with the two 
product lines. Its profit associated with the product line (NB, 0) is ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻∗ . Its profit associated with (NB, 
PL), on the other hand, depends on the value of 𝑐஻. As we have seen in the proof of Proposition 4, for 
𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯ the equilibrium joint profit is the same as that under perfect information, equaling Π஻ு∗ . 
Accordingly, the NB supplier’s profit in this case is ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻ு∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு. Therefore, for 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯ 
the NB supplier would earn a larger profit from (NB, PL) than from (NB, 0) if ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻ு∗ െ ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ෡ு ൐
ሺ1 െ 𝜔ሻΠ஻∗ , i.e., if Π஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ െ Π෡ு ൐ 0. 
From Lemma 2, we have 
Π෡ு ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶ
4𝑠ு െ
1
16𝑠ு ቊ
ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻሾሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ு െ 𝛿𝑠ு?̅?ሿ
𝑐ு ቋ
ଶ
.  ሺ𝐴58ሻ 
Subtracting (A58) from Π஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗  in (A10) and rewriting, we obtain 
Π஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ െ Π෡ு ൌ  
ሺ1 ൅ 𝛿ሻሾሺ𝑠ு𝑐஻ െ 𝑠஻𝑐ுሻଶ െ 𝑠஻ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻଶሿ
4𝑠ு𝑠஻ሺ𝑠஻ െ 𝑠ுሻ
൅ 116𝑠ு ቊ
ሺ𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ுሻሾሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑐ு െ 𝛿𝑠ு?̅?ሿ
𝑐ு ቋ
ଶ
.  ሺ𝐴59ሻ 
Using (A59), we find that Π஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ െ Π෡ு ൐ 0 if 𝑐஻ ൐ 𝑐஻௖಩.  
Note that the above comparison of profits is based on the premise that 𝑐஻ ∈ ൫𝑐஻௖ , 𝑐஻௖ᇲ൯. Hence, the 
condition 𝑐஻ ൐ 𝑐஻௖಩ is relevant only if 𝑐஻௖ᇲ ൐ 𝑐஻௖಩. Below we show that 𝑐஻௖ᇲ ൐ 𝑐஻௖಩ if 𝑠஻ is sufficiently large. 
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Using (30), we find 
lim௦ಳ→ஶ ቆ
𝑐஻௖ᇲ
𝑠஻ ቇ ൌ ?̅?,         ሺ𝐴60ሻ 
and using (31) we obtain 
lim௦ಳ→ஶ ൭
𝑐஻௖಩
𝑠஻ ൱ ൌ
𝑐ு
𝑠ு ൅
𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ு
2𝑠ு𝑐ு ඨ
𝛿
1 ൅ 𝛿 ሾ2ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑠ு?̅?𝑐ு െ 𝛿𝑐ு
ଶ െ 𝛿𝑠ுଶ ?̅?ଶሿ  .          ሺ𝐴61ሻ 
Combining (A60) and (A61), we find that  
lim௦ಳ→ஶ ൭
𝑐஻௖಩
𝑐஻௖ᇲ
൱ ൌ 𝑐ு?̅?𝑠ு ൅
𝑠ு?̅? െ 𝑐ு
2?̅?𝑠ு𝑐ு
ඨ 𝛿1 ൅ 𝛿 ሾ2ሺ2 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑠ு?̅?𝑐ு െ 𝛿𝑐ு
ଶ െ 𝛿𝑠ுଶ ?̅?ଶሿ    ሺ𝐴62ሻ 
is less than 1 given that 𝑐ு ∈ ൫𝑐ுఊ , 𝑐ுఈ൯. Therefore, there exists 𝑆 ൐ 0 such that 𝑐஻௖ᇲ ൐ 𝑐஻௖಩ for 𝑠஻ ൐ 𝑆. 
The above analysis implies that for a sufficiently large 𝑠஻, Π஻ு∗ െ Π஻∗ െ Π෡ு ൐ 0 if 𝑐஻ is in the interval 
ሺ𝑐஻௖಩, 𝑐஻௖ᇲሿ. For 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ᇲሻ, on the other hand, the relevant profit comparison is between Π෡஻ு െ Π෡ு and 
Π஻∗ . Since Π஻ு∗ ൌ Π෡஻ு at 𝑐஻ ൌ 𝑐஻௖ᇲ, by continuity we know that there exists a 𝑐஻௕಩ in the interval ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕ᇲሻ 
such that Π෡஻ு െ Π෡ுെ Π஻∗ ൐ 0 if 𝑐஻ ∈ ሺ𝑐஻௖ᇲ, 𝑐஻௕಩ሻ. Q.E.D. 
 
  
